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ARTICLES
THE PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DUTY TO SEEK
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE
HANDS: LESSONS FROM ENGLAND
Stanley Z. Fisher
INTRODUCTION
IN Kyles v. Whitley,' a divided Supreme Court reversed defendant's
_capital murder conviction because prosecutors, who had responded
to a pretrial defense motion for disclosure by saying that there was
"no exculpatory evidence of any nature,"- had in fact failed to disclose
numerous pieces of exculpatory evidence to the defense. The Court
found that the undisclosed evidence might have bolstered the
defendant's claim that he was innocent, and that the true perpetrator
was an uncharged informant named Beanie. In its brief, the State of
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to Mike
McConville, Chairman, School of Law at the University of Warwick, England, and to
his staff for graciously hosting my research visit there in the Spring of 1999. Professor
McConville and Roger Leng of that school were both generous with their time,
contacts and expertise. I am also indebted to the Crown Prosecutors, police officials,
defense solicitors, and others in England who responded to my requests for
information with remarkable patience and kindness. Finally, I appreciate the skillful
research assistance I received from Colin Kisor, J. Peyton Worley, and Jeffrey Rupp,
guidance on source materials from colleagues Robert Bone and Susan Koniak, and
helpful editorial suggestions from Eric Blumenson, Dan Givelber, Kevin McMunigal,
and Harry Subin.
1. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
2. ld. at 428 (quoting prosecutor).
3. Non-disclosed items known to the police included: initial eyewitness
statements taken by police (arguably closer to fitting Beanie); police records
establishing Beanie's initial call to the police; his inconsistent statements to the police,
and his suggestion that the police search defendant's rubbish; evidence linking Beanie
to other crimes committed at the same grocery store and to an unrelated murder;, and
a computer printout of the license numbers of the cars police found in the parking lot
on the night of the murder (which did not include defendant's car, although it was the
police theory that the killer had left his car in the lot after driving off with the victim's
car and the jury had been shown a grainy enlargement of a crime scene photograph
that supposedly had defendant's car in the background). See id. at 428-30. Kyles was
retried three times after the Supreme Court reversed his conviction, resulting in a
hung jury each time. He was released in 1998 after 14 years in prison, coming once
within 30 hours of execution. See Pamela Coyle, Tried and Tried Again: Defense
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Louisiana argued that some of the exculpatory evidence was not
disclosed even to the prosecutor until after trial, and that the state
"should not be held accountable ... for evidence known only to police
investigators and not to the prosecutor."4 Until Kyles, the Supreme
Court never had cause to decide this claim,5 which the Court rejected:
[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in
the case, including the police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds
or fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that is, a failure to
disclose is in good faith or bad faith), the prosecution's responsibility
for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material
level of importance is inescapable. 6
The Supreme Court again applied the Kyles doctrine in 1999. Like
Curtis Kyles, Tommy David Strickler brought federal habeas
proceedings to attack a capital conviction and death sentence on
Brady grounds.7 The trial prosecutor gave defense counsel "open
file" discovery, but his files did not contain certain exculpatory
materials found in the police files after conviction.' These materials
Lawyers Say the D.A. Went Too Far Prosecuting a Louisiana Man Five Times for
Murder, 84 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 38-39.
4. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438. In oral argument, the state renounced this argument,
conceding that the state is "held to a disclosure standard based on what all State
officers at the time knew." Id. at n.11.
5. Even before Kyles, courts had generally held the prosecutor responsible under
Brady for disclosing material information known only to the police. See, e.g., Barbee
v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964) ("The duty to disclose is that of the state,
which ordinarily acts through the prosecuting attorney; but if he too is the victim of
police suppression of the material information, the state's failure is not on that
account excused."); Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement,
and the Prosecution Team, 16 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 331, 347 (1998) ("[Flederal
discovery obligations extend to those government agencies that are so closely
'aligned' with the prosecution of a specific matter that justice requires their records be
subject to the respective discovery obligations."); Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady
v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1673, 1699(1996) (distinguishing between prosecutors' "classic Brady" duty to disclose material
exculpatory evidence that they possess or of which they know, and their "search
Brady" duty, requiring prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to locate and disclose
such evidence that is not known personally to them).
6. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
7. See Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1946-47 (1999).
8. In federal habeas proceedings, the district court issued a sealed, ex parte order
granting petitioner's counsel the right to examine and copy all of the police and
prosecution files in the case. The Supreme Court noted, without deciding, that the
district court might have lacked authority to grant such sweeping discovery without a
showing of good cause. See id. at 1950; cf. State v. Landano, 637 A.2d 1270, 1279 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (indicating that a federal district court in habeas action
granted petitioner's ex parte application for a temporary restraining order, ordering
federal marshals to seize files maintained by several New Jersey police departments
as well as state and county prosecution agencies revealing critical exculpatory
evidence that, despite numerous earlier requests, had never been disclosed).
Landano's murder conviction was reversed, and he was ultimately freed. See Susan
Sachs, 2d Trial in Killing of Officer Ends With Acquittal, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1998, at
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might have been used to impeach the testimony of a key prosecution
eyewitness, Anne Stoltzfus. In her trial testimony, Stoltzfus claimed
to have identified Strickler's photograph "with absolute certainty."9
She also confidently and in great detail described Strickler's initial,
aggressive contacts with the victim.
However, undisclosed police notes of interviews with Stoltzfus, and
her written messages to the police, showed that she initially could
identify neither the victim, nor Strickler, and that her memory
improved only after several additional conversations with the police
and with the victim's boyfriend. 10 The trial prosecutor asserted, and
the defense denied, that some of these exculpatory documents were in
the prosecution files examined by the defense." But the prosecutor
conceded that he had never seen some of the documents until long
after the trial.'2 Relying on Kyles, the Supreme Court cited the
individual prosecutor's "duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in [the] case,
including the police."' 3
In Kyles, the Court justified this conclusion by appeals to precedent,
administrative feasibility, and policy:
[N]o one doubts that police investigators sometimes fail to inform a
prosecutor of all they know. But neither is there any serious doubt
that 'procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the
prosecutor's] burden and to insure communication of all relevant
information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.' Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).... [A]ny argument for
excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he does not happen to
know about boils down to a plea to substitute the police for the
prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters
of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.' 4
The Court's last point, that excusing a prosecutor's failure to
disclose information known to the police would make them the "final
arbiters" of the state's disclosure obligations, makes sense. Neither
the dissenters in Kyles nor courts generally have disputed this
B1.
9. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting case record).
10. See id at 194445 & n.9.
11. See id. at 1945.
12. See i.
13. See id. at 1948 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)). After a
lengthy analysis of the evidence produced at trial, the Court upheld Strickler's death
sentence on grounds that the suppressed evidence was not "material." Id. at 1952-55.
Although there was a "reasonable possibility" that Strickler would not have been
sentenced to death if the suppressed material had been disclosed, he had failed to
meet Brady's stricter standard of materiality: a "reasonable probability" of a different
result. Id. at 1953. In a separate opinion, Justice Souter argued for changing the
Brady materiality standard from a "reasonable probability" to a "significant
possibility." d. at 1956-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
14. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
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proposition. The Court's doctrinal and administrative rationales,
however, are less satisfying. They either ignore or pay insufficient
attention to the actual relationship between police and prosecutors.
Doctrinally, the Court relied on Giglio v. United States,5 which
holds only that one prosecutor should be held accountable for
exculpatory evidence in the possession of another prosecutor in the
same office:
The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman
for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be
attributed, for these purposes, to the Government. To the extent
this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures and
regulations can be established to carry that burden and to insure
communication of all relevant information on each case to every
lawyer who deals with it.1 6
The Kyles court failed to acknowledge the distinction between
holding prosecutors strictly responsible for the conduct of other
prosecutors (in the same office), and for the conduct of police, who
are not normally employed by or directly accountable to the
prosecutor. 7  Thus, Giglio hardly supports an extension of
prosecutorial responsibility to include undisclosed evidence in the
hands of the police.
The Kyles Court also makes a crucial but dubious empirical claim:
that a prosecutor "has the means to discharge the government's Brady
responsibility" by establishing "procedures and regulations" to ensure
a flow of "all relevant information" from the police to his office. 8
According to the Court's reasoning, because the prosecutor has the
ability to learn of exculpatory evidence in the hands of police, she
bears the responsibility under Brady to ensure disclosure to the
defense. Do prosecutors actually have this ability? The Court offers
no support for its optimistic assertion. On the contrary, state and
local police agencies generally operate independently of prosecutors,
15. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
16. Id. at 154 (citations omitted). As authority for holding the prosecution
responsible for a promise made by one of its assistants, the Court cited Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 272 (1958), and American Bar Association, Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, Standard
2.1(d) (1970). According to the ABA Standards, a prosecutor's obligation extends to
material in possession or control of persons who have "participated in the
investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or, with
reference to the particular case, have reported to the prosecutor's office." Standards
for Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, Standard 11-2.1(d) (2d
ed. 1980).
17. See Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am": Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 N. Eng. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1993) [hereinafter
Fisher, Just the Facts]; Donald M. McIntyre, Impediments to Effective Police
Prosecutor Relationships, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 201,223-24 (1975).
18. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972)).
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and answer to different constituencies.' 9 As a result, prosecutorial
access to information known to the police is a matter of persuasion
and negotiation, rather than authority. The relationship is governed
by informal practices about which little is known.
If, in fact, prosecutors lack the power to ensure police transmission
of exculpatory evidence to them, then the Court's decision in Kyles
places an unrealistic burden on the prosecutor "to insure
communication of all relevant information [known to the police] on
each case. ..." Even more troublesome, the Court simply glosses
over an important underlying problem. As Kyles, Strickler, and other
disturbing cases2 l illustrate, whether the defendant's right to be
19. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 53. The situation might not be any
different in the federal jurisdiction. For instance, in United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d
753 (1st Cir. 1991), despite a court order to disclose a key witness's prior criminal
conduct, the prosecutor failed to reveal extensive activity known to FBI agents
involved in the case. The prosecutor maintained that the information had been
disclosed as soon as it was received from the FBI. See id. at 760. Denying defendant
relief for lack of prejudice, the Court nonetheless stated:
[T]he prosecutor is duty bound to demand compliance with disclosure
responsibilities by all relevant dimensions of the government. Ultimately,
regardless of whether the prosecutor is able to frame and enforce directives
to the investigative agencies to respond candidly and fully to disclosure
orders, responsibility for failure to meet disclosure obligations will be
assessed by the courts against the prosecutor and his office.
Id at 762; see also Rory K. Little, Proportionality as anl Ethical Precept for
Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 723, 736 (1999)
("[lnvestigative agencies have 'a considerable degree of independence' from
prosecutors: 'the relationship between federal investigative agencies and federal
prosecutors is coordinate, not hierarchical."' (quoting Daniel C. Richman, Federal
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L
Rev. 757,780 (1999))).
20. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972)). For an argument that the prosecutor's constitutional duty extends only to
favorable evidence of which she knew or should have known, see Hochman, supra
note 5, at 1699 (1996). In this helpful student Comment, Hochman distinguishes
between two duties of the prosecutor under Brady: the "classic Brady" duty to
disclose material exculpatory evidence that she possesses or of which she knows, and
the "search Brady" duty, requiring prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to locate
and disclose such evidence that is not known personally to them. See id. According to
Hochman, the "classic Brady" duty also binds non-prosecutor state agents who fail to
disclose that material exculpatory evidence exists. See id. at 1697-99, 1702-03. Thus,
in Kyles, the Court should have reversed because the police, rather than the
prosecutor, suppressed the exculpatory evidence. Although the result to the
defendant is the same under either analysis, Hochman argues that doctrinal clarity is
advanced by attributing Brady obligations directly to other state agents in addition to
the prosecutor. Hochman is correct that non-prosecutor state agents, including the
police, are constitutionally answerable for their own conduct in suppressing evidence
to which the defendant has a right under Brady. See infra notes 265-72 and
accompanying text.
21. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), A.T.F. investigators failed to
inform the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted the case that the suppressed
compensation agreements existed. See id. at 671 & n.4. Defendants in a number of
other cases have been convicted and sentenced to death or long prison terms, only
later to discover that the police had suppressed crucial exculpatory evidence. Two
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informed of exculpatory evidence will be implemented depends
largely upon the prosecutor's access to information in police hands.22
But the prosecutor's access in turn depends upon police cooperation
in recording, preserving, and revealing exculpatory evidence to the
prosecutor. If that cooperation is not forthcoming, the prosecutor's
ability to comply with Brady is fatally compromised.
In a previous article, I argued that police reports in this country
differ "from those produced under a truly neutral system of
investigation, such as reportedly exists in France and Germany, where
the police are required to investigate and record exculpatory as well as
inculpatory facts."'  While American police departments pay lip
service to the goal of reporting "all relevant evidence" in criminal
investigations, in practice police reports are "artifacts of the adversary
process," which tend to include evidence of guilt and omit exculpatory
facts.24 Courts have been unwilling to buttress Brady rights by
requiring the police, either generally or in particular cases, to
investigate, record, or reveal exculpatory evidence to prosecutors.-5 In
addition, prosecutors normally lack the power (and perhaps the
motivation) to insist upon access to exculpatory evidence known to
the police.26 As a result, I concluded, we suffer a systematic loss and
suppression of exculpatory evidence at the stage of police
investigation and reporting. As another writer has stated, this
"fundamentally impairs the functioning of the fact finding process and
its ability to determine guilt or innocence correctly."27 By way of a
remedy, I proposed, inter alia, that "rules of procedure and ethics
should require prosecutors to familiarize themselves with police
investigative and record-keeping procedures, to press the police to
report specified categories of potentially exculpatory facts,28 and to
make good faith efforts to ensure their access to all relevant
more egregious examples are Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1991), and Jones v.
City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988). For a detailed discussion of Jones, see
Fisher. Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 2-4, 36-38, 40-42.
22. But see Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea
Process, 40 Hastings L.J. 957, 1002-03 (1989) (arguing that much Brady material will
be known to the prosecutor independently regardless of police cooperation).
23. Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 57 (citing John H. Langbein & Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 Yale L.J. 1549,
1554, 1562-63 & n.51 (1978)); see StrafprozeBordnung [StPO] §§ 136(11), 160(11)
(German Code of Criminal Procedure).
24. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 17-31, 57.
25. See id. at 40-48.
26. See id. at 51-54
27. Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation: A
Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 835, 835 (1978).
28. Suggested categories included "the identities of percipient witnesses, their
state of sobriety, discrepancies in witness descriptions of the perpetrator,
discrepancies between such descriptions and the defendant's appearance, any alibi
offered by the defendant, and the identity of any alibi witnesses." Fisher, Just the
Facts, supra note 17, at 49-50.
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In this Article I revisit, in light of recent developments, the
prosecutor's responsibility to disclose exculpatory evidence known to
the police. In Part I, I describe a recent English' statute that
establishes a detailed legislative framework regulating prosecutorial
access to relevant evidence gathered by the police. The rigorous
demands that English law makes upon police and prosecutors to
ensure prosecution access to police investigative files contrasts
strongly -with our own laissez faire approach. This has led me to
reexamine my own previous recommendations. Although an English-
style legislative solution would be the most direct and effective
remedy, I doubt that the political will to pass such legislation exists.
Recognizing the likelihood of continuing legislative (and judicial)
abstention, we must call prosecutors to greater account. Accordingly,
in Part II of this Article, I propose amendments to the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Standards for the
Prosecution Function. These amendments aim to reinforce the
prosecutor's responsibilities under Brady and Kyles v. Whitley to
obtain access to relevant information known to the police.
I. ENGLISH LAW: THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
INVESTIGATION ACT, 1996
The complex evolution of English criminal disclosure law3
29. Id. at 55. I also proposed that defense attorneys should attempt to document
police record-keeping practices, draft discovery requests to include informal
investigative documents such as field notes, and consider suing the police for
equitable relief. See id. at 56.
30. Although I refer in this Article to "English" law, the law described actually
applies to both England and Wales. By "police" I mean also to include criminal
investigators acting for other law enforcement agencies.
31. My account of English law and practice draws upon the literature cited below,
and on field interviews conducted in April 1999 with English prosecutors, defense
lawyers, police, academic experts, and others knowledgeable about the history and
implementation of the disclosure law. My informants included: high, middle, and
low-level staff of the Crown Prosecution Service in London, Coventry, and Abingdon;
criminal defense solicitors in London and Birmingham; police officials in London and
at the West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters in Hindlip, Worcester;, senior staff at
JUSTICE headquarters in London and at the Criminal Cases Review Commission in
Birmingham. The prosecutors and defense lawyers I spoke with were all solicitors;
regrettably, I had no opportunity to interview any barristers. I also had the invaluable
benefit of information and advice from expert faculty of the University of Warwick
Law School. In footnote references I have identified most informants by their
position rather than by name.
I have relied principally on the following published sources. For general works on
English criminal procedure, see Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An
Evaluative Study (2d ed. 1998); Frank Belloni & Jacqueline Hodgson, Criminal
Injustice: An Evaluation of the Criminal Justice Process in Britain (2000);
Blackstone's Criminal Practice 1999 (Peter Murphy ed., 9th ed. 1999); Justice in Error
(Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1993); Mike McConville et al., The Case for the
Prosecution (1991); John Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in England and Wales, in
2000]
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culminated in England's Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act,
1996 ("CPIA" or "Act")" and a subsidiary Police Code of Practice
("Code").33 The Act made major changes in the law governing the
prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.'
Although I will describe these developments in English disclosure law,
I do so only in order to give context to a related, but distinct, feature
of the Act that is of prime interest in this Article: the Act's
comprehensive regulation of prosecution access to information in
police files. The Act provides that:
1. the police must list on schedules all existing items of relevant
evidence, including exculpatory evidence, and their location;
Comparative Criminal Procedure, ch. 4 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996); Graham
Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is it Better Than Ours?, 26 Ariz. L Rev. 507 (1984).
On the law of pretrial disclosure, see David Corker, Disclosure in Criminal
Proceedings (1996); Roger Leng & Richard Taylor, Blackstone's Guide to the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (1996); John Niblett, Disclosure in
Criminal Proceedings (1997); Anthony Edwards, The Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996: The Procedural Aspects, 1997 Crim. L. Rev. 321; Ben
Fitzpatrick, Disclosure: Principles, Processes and Politics, in Miscarriages of Justice:
A Review of Justice in Error 151 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1999); Roger
Leng. Defence Strategies for Information Deficit: Negotiating the CPIA, 1 Int'l. J.
Evidence & Proof 215 (1997) [hereinafter Leng, Defence Strategies]; Patrick
O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and Justice, in Justice in Error,
supra, at 101; British Academy of Forensic Sciences, Disclosure Under the Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (unpublished papers presented at Seminar held
at Gray's Inn, Dec. 1, 1999, chaired by Lord Mackay of Clashfern) (on file with
author); Home Office, Disclosure: A Consultation Document (1995) (unpublished,
on file with author); JUSTICE, Disclosure: A Consultation Paper, The JUSTICE
Response (1995) (unpublished, on file with author).
I refer in this Article to the impact of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984("PACE") on pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence, but I do not discuss PACE
in detail. For scholarship on PACE, see generally David Brown, Detention at the
Police Station Under the Police and Criminal Investigations Act 1984 (Home Office
Research Study No. 104, 1989); David Brown, Investigating Burglary: The Effects of
PACE (Home Office Research Study No. 123, 1991); David Brown, Pace Ten Years
on: A Review of the Research (Home Office Research Study No. 155, 1997)[hereinafter Brown, PACE Ten Years On]; Stephen Moston & Geoffrey M.
Stephenson, The Questioning and Interviewing of Suspects Outside the Police Station(Royal Comm'n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 22, 1993); Michael Zander, The
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (rev'd 2d ed. 1990); Clive Coleman et al.,
Police Investigative Procedures: Researching the Impact of PACE, in Justice in Error,
supra, at 17; Symposium, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 1985 Crim. L.
Rev. 535; Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 Hastings L.J. 1 (1986).
32. Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996, ch. 25 (Eng.) [hereinafter
CPIA].
33. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s.23(1): Code of Practice
(effective Apr. 1, 1997), reprinted in Blackstone's Criminal Practice 1999, supra note
31, app. 6 [hereinafter CPIA Code of Practice]. In this Article I refer to the Act and
Code of Practice together as "the Act."
34. As discussed infra, these changes were motivated by perceived abuses of the
defendant's right, under prior law, to broad, "open file" discovery. See infra notes 51-
60 and accompanying text.
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2. the police must give copies of the schedules to the prosecution;35
3. the police must give the prosecutor access to all investigatory
materials in their possession; and
4. record-keeping obligations must be assigned to specific police
officers or employees, who must certify their compliance in writing
to the prosecutor.
In the following sections I will describe the background to the Act,
its requirements regarding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in
serious criminal cases, and the duties of police to investigate, record,
retain and reveal such evidence to the prosecutor. I will then discuss
issues that have arisen regarding implementation of the Act. Readers
who would like background information about the English system of
criminal prosecution may refer to the brief discussion of this subject in
Appendix A to this paper. 6
A. The Evolution of Pre-1996 English Disclosure Law
The complex history of English disclosure law has been detailed
elsewhere3 Until enactment of the CPIA in 1996, England had no
formal system of discovery in criminal proceedings.-" However, the
accused's right to advance notice of relevant evidence in possession of
the prosecution was considered a fundamental right." On the other
hand, before 1996 the accused owed only a very limited duty to
disclose his defense to the prosecution. This was radically changed
by the new Act.
English law distinguishes between evidence that the prosecution
intends to produce at trial to prove its case, and other relevant
"unused material" in its possession. As to the former, English
practice for at least the past century has required advance disclosure
of the prosecution case to the defense." The pre-Act law governing
disclosure of unused evidence developed as follows. Following
several miscarriages of justice in the 1970s involving fabrication of
35. Except for "sensitive" items, copies also are given to the defense. See infra
notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Appendix A (Organization of Criminal Courts, Prosecution and
Police, and Police Record-Keeping, in England).
37. See generally Niblett, supra note 31 (detailing the history of English disclosure
law); O'Connor, supra note 31, at 101-27 (same).
38. See Niblett, supra note 31, at 3.
39. "[I]n our adversarial system, in which the police and prosecution control the
investigatory process, an accused's right to fair disclosure is an inseparable part of his
right to a fair trial." R. v. Brown [1995] 1 Crim. App. 191, 198 (opinion of Steyn, L.)
(noting in dicta that there is no prosecution duty to disclose information tending to
discredit defense witnesses); see also Corker, supra note 31, at 7-9, 21-39 (discussing
the development of disclosure law).
40. Prior to the Act, the defense was required to disclose only alibi defenses and
intention to present expert evidence. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
41. See Corker, supra note 31, ch. 4; Niblett, supra note 31, at 34.
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evidence and/or non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence,42  the
Attorney General in 1981 promulgated the Guidelines for the
Disclosure of "Unused Material" to the Defence.43 The Guidelines
declared that, in cases to be tried on indictment, prosecutors have a
duty before trial to disclose "unused material" to the defense.
"Unused material" had to be disclosed "if it ha[d] some bearing on
the offence(s) charged and the surrounding circumstances of the
case."'  The disclosure obligation was subject to specifically defined
discretionary exceptions but, in case of doubt, a presumption in favor
of disclosure applied."a
The Guidelines were the first statement of nationally uniform
disclosure principles, but were not legally binding. 6 The courts,
however, came to regard the Guidelines as reflecting minimum
common law requirements. 47  Furthermore, in the fifteen years
between promulgation of the Guidelines and passage of the 1996 Act,
the courts expanded the prosecution's disclosure obligations in two
major respects: first, by eliminating the prosecution's unilateral
discretion, asserted under the Guidelines, to withhold disclosure in
particular cases; and second, by broadening the scope of the "unused
material" that must be disclosed. Both developments significantly
influenced the content of the 1996 Act. In a third important step, the
Crown Prosecution Service issued record-keeping guidelines to the
police.
The Guidelines initially authorized the prosecutor unilaterally to
withhold otherwise disclosable material from the defense in a number
of specifically defined circumstances. The Court of Appeal, however,
in reversing the notorious wrongful conviction in Regina v. Ward,4
eliminated the prosecutor's unilateral discretion. Applying the civil
law doctrine of "public interest immunity" ("PII"), the Court instead
42. See Corker, supra note 31, at 35; Niblett, supra note 31, ch. 3; O'Connor, supra
note 31, at 102-06; infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
43. See The Attorney-General's Guidelines for the Disclosure of "Unused
Material" to the Defence (1981), [1982] 74 Crim. App. 302, reprinted in Niblett, supra
note 31, app. 1 [hereinafter Guidelines]. The Guidelines were promulgated
immediately following issuance of the Philips Commission report, which was critical
of prosecution disclosure practices. See Corker, supra note 31, at 28. For discussion of
the events leading up to issuance of the Guidelines, see Niblett, supra note 31, ch. 6.
44. Guidelines, supra note 43, § 2. Disclosure was to be accomplished by
providing copies of documents shorter than 50 pages, and permitting inspection of
longer ones. See id. §§ 4-5.
45. Seeid. §§6,9.
46. See Corker, supra note 31, at 34.
47. See Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report 91 n.20 (London: HMSO,
1993) [hereinafter Runciman Comm'n Report] (stating that the guidelines "to all
intents and purposes have the force of law").
48. Regina v. Ward, [19931 1 W.L.R. 619, 692 (Eng. C.A.). Judith Ward was
released after serving 18 years in prison for causing several fatal explosions. Her
successful appeal revealed massive suppression of exculpatory material by
government officials. See Niblett, supra note 31, at 1-3, 74-77, 115-16.
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required the prosecutor in each case to obtain court approval to
withhold sensitive items of disclosable material from the defense. 9
The 1996 Act incorporated the regime of judicial control over non-
disclosure based upon PII.1
The 1989 Guinness Rulingjl broadened the scope of "unused
material" that must be disclosed to the defense. The court made clear
that "the Guidelines were not confined to statements, but included
any document or information conveyed orally which had a bearing on
the offence charged or surrounding circumstances. In short [subject to
the PIH exception], virtually everything gathered or created by the
investigator was prima facie disclosable. "'
Seeking to comply with the Guinness Ruling, the Crown
Prosecution Service in 1992 issued a three-page memorandum, known
as the "Guinness Advice,"53 to chiefs of police throughout the country.
The Advice made clear that the disclosure duties of the "prosecution"
extend to police officers and forensic scientists'' and charged these
parties with an obligation to preserve potentially disclosable material
and make it available to the prosecution. Specifically, it provided that
49. See Niblett, supra note 31, chs. 9, 10; see also Rowe & Davis v. United
Kingdom (Eur. Comm'n H.R., Oct. 20, 1998), reprinted in 1999 Crim. L Rev. 410,411
(finding it a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights for
prosecutor to decide nondisclosure of allegedly sensitive materials without
opportunity for trial court review). Ward also required the prosecution to notify the
defense of its application for PI1, but the Court laid down exceptions to the notice
requirement, which remain in force after adoption of the CPIA 1996. See Corker,
supra note 31, at 115-19; Niblett, supra note 31, at 78-79.
50. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
51. R. v. Saunders & Others (unreported, Central Criminal Court, Aug. 29, 1989)
("Guinness 1"). The opinion is a trial judge's opinion, which is neither "reported" nor
published. The history of the Saunders litigation is referred to in R. v. Saunders,
[1996] 1 Crim. App. 463. See also R. v. Saunders, 1990 Crim. L Rev. 597 (briefly
summarizing the history of the case). Published mentions of the "unreported"
opinion of the trial judge (Henry) may also be found in Niblett,supra note 31, at 3, 67;
Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 154-55 & nn.12-18; and O'Connor, supra note 31, at 108.
52. Niblett, supra note 31, at 71 (emphasis added). Although the scope of
disclosable material was marginally narrowed in 1994 to material that was "relevant
or possibly relevant to an issue in the case," it remained extremely broad. Regina v.
Keane, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 746, 752. The breadth of the prosecutor's disclosure duty is
reflected in the Code of Conduct for barristers, requiring prosecutors to "ensure that
all relevant evidence is either presented by the prosecution or made available to the
defence." Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, Standard 11.2
(emphasis added).
53. Crown Prosecution Service, Guinness Advice (1992), reprinted in O'Connor,
supra note 31, at 123 [hereinafter Guinness Advice].
54. Guinness Advice, supra note 53, para. 3. The courts also defined "the
prosecution" broadly to include prosecution experts for purposes of the disclosure
obligation. See Corker, supra note 31, at 38. Although several notorious English
miscarriage cases were attributable to the suppression of forensic evidence, "neither
the [CPIA 1996] nor the [Practice] Code addresses the duty of scientists to disclose
[exculpatory] information, either to the police and prosecutors or to the defence."
Mike Redmayne, Process Gains and Process Values: The Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996,60 Mod. L. Rev. 79,82-83 (1997).
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"[i]n the course of any enquiry... police officers should maintain a
schedule of all material coming into their possession and should copy
that schedule to the CPS with the case papers."55 The Advice listed a
number of categories of material that should be retained and included
in the schedule, including notes of interviews with actual or potential
witnesses, suspects, or defendants, statements taken from potential
witnesses "whether or not they assist the prosecution case,"
documents containing a description of the alleged criminal by a
potential witness, crime reports, custody records, communications
with forensic witnesses, and materials casting doubt upon the
reliability or consistency of potential witnesses, or upon the reliability
of a confession 6.5  Relevant information received orally must be
recorded and included on the schedule.57  The recording and
scheduling duties imposed on police by this document were carried
forward into the CPIA and the Code of Practice. 8 Furthermore, the
defense became entitled under the Act to receive copies of the police
schedules listing relevant, non-sensitive materials gathered in the
investigation. 59
As a result of these developments, by the mid-1990s the defendant
charged with a serious crime in England was entitled to virtually
"open file" discovery. He had a right to copy or inspect the evidence
supporting the prosecution's case, as well as any relevant "unused
material" that might "possibly" be relevant to an issue in the case, or
which might realistically provide a lead to such evidence. The sole
exception to this right was through judicial grants of public interest
immunity. But even in such cases, the police were required to record
and reveal the information to the prosecutor.
B. The Legislative and Political Background to the CPIA
Law enforcement dissatisfaction with such broad defense access to
unused material was a major reason for the passage of the 1996 Act.
Passed by a conservative government, the Act's primary goal and
effect was to restrict defense access to information in police and
prosecution files. At the same time, by formalizing and expanding
police duties to investigate and record potentially exculpatory
evidence, and to reveal it to prosecutors, the Act reinforced the
prosecutor's access to all relevant evidence.
The 1996 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act was one of
several major pieces of law reform legislation enacted in England
since the mid-1980s. The immediate impetus for many of the reforms
55. See Guinness Advice, supra note 53, para. 5 (emphasis added).
56. Id. para. 8.
57. See id. para. 9.
58. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 23(1)(b); CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§
5.1-5.5, 6.2.
59. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 2A(3); CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 6.3.
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was a series of notorious miscarriages of justice that attracted public
attention in Great Britain during the past few decades.' Some arose
out of prosecution for IRA bombings in the 1970s;" others were
ordinary criminal cases.62 A number of official commissions were
appointed to investigate particular miscarriages and/or to consider the
need for systemic reforms.6 Many of their reform proposals were
enacted into legislation, the most important of which for our purposes
was the Police and Evidence Act, 1984 ("PACE") and Codes of
Practice.64 PACE reformed police procedures for search and seizure,
arrest, detention, questioning, and charge. '
Despite their origins in public inquiries into convictions of innocent
defendants, many of these reforms served the "law and order"
political agenda of the conservative governments then in power.6
60. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
61. For a summary of the history of recent miscarriage cases in the United
Kingdom, and subsequent law reform measures, see Ashworth, supra note 31, at 11-
18; Belloni & Hodgson, supra note 31, at 1-21; Justice in Error, supra note 31, at 6-13.
The role of non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence as grounds for reversing some of
these convictions, and others, is discussed in Niblett, supra note 31. at 17-21.
62 See Niblett, supra note 31, at 21-31.
63. See, e.g., Lord Devlin, Report to the Secretary of State for the Home
Department of the Departmental Committee on the Evidence of Identification in
Criminal Cases (London: HMSO, 1976) (reviewing wrongful convictions and
discussing procedures relating to identification evidence); Runciman Comm'n Report,
supra note 47 (same).
64. See generally Zander, supra note 31 (outlining changes made under the Act).
PACE was enacted following the report of the Philips Commission, which was
appointed in the wake of a miscarriage of justice in the Confait case, [19751 62 Crim.
App. 53. See Justice in Error, supra note 31, at 7. There are five PACE Codes of
Practice: Code A (stop and search); Code B (search and seizure); Code C (detention,
treatment, and questioning of suspects); Code D (identification): and Code E (tape
recording of interviews -vith suspects). See Zander, supra note 32, at 155.
Another important reform stemming from the 1981 Philips Commission Report
was the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which established the Crown Prosecution
Service. See Francis Bennion, The New Prosecution Arrangements: The Crown
Prosecution Service, 1986 Crim. L. Rev. 3, 9; A. F. Wilcox, Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure: The Proposed Prosecution Process, 1981 Crim. L Rev. 482, 483.
Regarding other criminal justice reforms enacted in England in the past decade, see
supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
65. PACE section 59 also established a duty solicitor scheme, providing a
mechanism to implement the right of detained suspects to consult a solicitor at the
police station. See Andrew Saunders & Lee Bridges, The Right to Legal Advice, in
Justice in Error, supra note 31, at 37, 46-47; Zander, supra note 31, at 107-10.
66. See, eg., Lee Bridges & Mike McConville, Keeping Faith With Their Own
Convictions: The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 57 Mod. L Rev. 75, 76
(1994) (discussing conservative political influences on the 1993 Runciman
Commission Report); see also infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. For example,
PACE expanded police powers to stop, search, and detain suspects. See Lee Bridges
& Tony Bunyon, Britain's New Urban Policing Strategy-fite Police and Criminal
Evidence Bill in Context, 10 J.L. & Soc'y 85, 85-94 (1983); Coleman et al., supra note
31, at 18-21. Also, the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act restricted the
accused's right of silence by allowing comment on his exercise of the right to remain
silent during investigation and at trial. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act,
1994, ch. 34(5) (Eng.). These changes were adopted despite the Royal Commission's
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However, these legislative and other reforms also led to the adoption
of strict record-keeping requirements for police investigators. These
requirements-particularly under PACE-were designed to prevent
the sort of fabrication or non-disclosure of evidence that had
characterized some of the most notorious miscarriage cases. Even
before enactment of the CPIA, these investigative records were made
available to prosecutors and, often, to the accused as well.67
In 1991, the Court of Appeal quashed the IRA pub-bombing
convictions in the Birmingham Six case. 68 On the same day, the
government announced appointment of a Royal Commission to study
the need for reforms in the criminal justice system. The Runciman
Commission's Report,69 issued in 1993, influenced the 1996 Act's
provisions.7" Although the Commission was established in response to
the problem of wrongful convictions, its technical mandate,7t and
some of its recommendations, gave greater emphasis to values of
crime control. The Commission was directed, inter alia,
to consider whether changes are needed in (i) the conduct of police
investigations and their supervision by senior police officers... ; (ii)
the role of the prosecutor in supervising the gathering of evidence
and deciding whether to proceed with a case, and the arrangements
for the disclosure of material, including unused material, to the
defence .... 72
Both supporters and critics of the existing law of pretrial disclosure
explicit rejection of them. See Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to
Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 402, 404, 426-27 (1994). These restrictions on the right to silence paved
the way for similar provisions in the CPIA. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying
text (CPIA sections 5(5) and 11 require the defendant in Crown Court cases to give a
defense statement, and allow comment at trial on testimony inconsistent with it).
67. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
68. See R. v. Mcllkenny & Others, [1992] 2 All E.R. 417, 432 (Eng. C.A.). This
followed reversal of murder convictions in another IRA pub-bombing case, that of
the "Guildford Four." See Unreliability of Police Evidence Quashes Convictions: Law
Report, Times (London), October 20, 1989.
69. See Runciman Comm'n Report, supra note 47.
70. Other reform legislation was also inspired by the Commission's Report,
including the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, supra note 68, and the
Criminal Appeal Act, 1995. See Criminal Appeal Act, ch. 35, 1995 (Eng.)(establishing the Criminal Cases Review Commission, an independent body to review
claims of wrongful convictions). The most recent addition to this series of English
criminal justice reform legislation is the Human Rights Act, 1998. See Sybil D. Sharpe,
Article 6 and the Disclosure of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1999 Crim. L. Rev. 273,
273 [hereinafter Sharpe, Article 6].
71. Specifically, it was asked "to examine the effectiveness of the criminal justice
system... in securing the conviction of those guilty of criminal offences and the
acquittal of those who are innocent, having regard to the efficient use of
resources...." Runciman Comm'n Report, supra note 47, at 1; see Bridges &
McConville, supra note 66, passim; Sybil Sharpe, Disclosure, Immunity and Fair
Trials, 63 J. Crim. L. 67, 67-68 (1999) [hereinafter Sharpe, Disclosure].
72. See Runciman Comm'n Report, supra note 47, at 1.
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presented testimony before the Commission, which accepted as valid
two criticisms of the status quo.73 First, the Commission found that
the defense could unnecessarily burden the police and prosecution by
requesting large amounts of material that was of no genuine
importance to the defense. Given the sheer volume of potentially
relevant material gathered in an investigation, compliance with such
"fishing expeditions" might not be feasible.74 Therefore, strategic
defense requests might force the prosecution to drop charges rather
than bear the costs of compliance. Second, the Commission found
that by pressing requests for unnecessary but potentially sensitive
material, the defense could force the prosecution to drop charges
rather than risk the harms resulting from disclosure. 5 Implicit in this
criticism was dissatisfaction with the existing safeguards for denying
disclosure based upon public interest immunity.76 Based on these
findings, the Commission recommended, and Parliament eventually
approved, a new two-stage disclosure scheme that applies, effectively,
to all criminal cases except for uncontested cases in the magistrates'
courts." The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and
subsidiary Code of Practice also established, in detail, the duties of
police 78 to gather and transmit potentially exculpatory evidence to the
prosecutor.
The Code of Practice did not take effect until April 1, 1997;79 by the
time of my visit to England in the Spring of 1999, it had been in place
for only two years. No systematic studies of the new law's operation
had been reported80 Although my field interviews were limited in
73. Liberal critics disputed both findings, as well as a third claim pressed by the
government, that broad pretrial disclosure led to false "ambush" defenses at trial and
unmerited acquittals. See Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 8-10. Ambush defenses
were discussed in the Runciman Commission Report, supra note 47, at 98. See also
Home Office, Disclosure: A Consultation Document 15 (1995) (unpublished, on file
with author) (arguing that defense disclosure is necessary to prevent ambush
defenses); JUSTICE, Disclosure: A Consultation Paper, The JUSTICE Response 18
(1995) (unpublished, on file with author) (arguing that concerns about ambush
defenses are unfounded).
74. "Even in some straightforward cases the amount of material collected during
the course of the investigation can be voluminous. In major inquiries, even with
computerised logs ... it is scarcely possible to be sure that all the material that has
been generated has been listed." Runciman Comm'n Report, supra note 47, at 93.
75. See id. 93-94; Redmayne, supra note 54, at 81.
76. See Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at 68.
77. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3; see also Niblett, supra note 31, at 230; Sharpe,
Article 6, supra note 70, at 274.
78. The Act also applies to criminal investigations conducted by officials other
than the police. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 1(4).
79. Different parts of the Act itself went into effect on different dates. See Leng &
Taylor, supra note 31, at 6. Before the law went into effect, nationwide training
programs were held, including joint training for prosecutors and police officers,
designed collaboratively by both groups.
80. Informal surveys of experience under the Act had been conducted among
barristers. See British Academy of Forensic Sciences, Disclosure Under the Criminal
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
number, scope, and geography,8' they provide some insight into the
issues that can arise in a system taking the English approach.
C. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
This section will briefly describe how the Act changes the English
law of pretrial discovery. It will then describe the duties of police to
investigate, record, retain, and reveal exculpatory evidence to the
prosecutor, both as prescribed by the Act and as they appear to work
in practice.
1. Disclosure Under the CPIA 1996
The Act does not alter the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the
defense inculpatory material that forms part of the prosecution's case
(the "used" material).' However, it replaces the prosecutor's
common law duty to disclose all of the unused material with a two-
stage reciprocal discovery scheme. In the first stage, primary
disclosure, the prosecution must disclose "prosecution material"'" not
previously disclosed, which in the prosecutor's opinion "might
undermine the case for the prosecution." 84 The defendant is then
required-on pain of sanctionss 5-to disclose his defense to the
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (unpublished papers presented at seminar
chaired by Lord Mackay of Clashfem held at Gray's Inn, Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with
author); interview with Superintendent R.K. Golding, Police Representative, Trial
Issues Group, CPS Headquarters, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
81. See supra note 31.
82. See supra notes 3941 and accompanying text. The Code presupposes that the
police will turn over to the prosecutor a file containing the material for the
prosecution case. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 7.1, 7.3.
83. "Prosecution material" is defined in section 3 of the Act as including
information and objects that are in the prosecutor's possession or that he has
inspected in connection with the case. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3. For an argument
that this definition gives the police effective control over what is disclosed to the
defense, see Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 219.
84. CPIA, supra note 32, § 3(1)(a). The test for primary disclosure is not further
defined by the Act. CPS training materials interpret the test to require disclosure of
"any material which is capable of having an adverse effect upon the strength of the
prosecution case." Crown Prosecution Serv., Disclosure Under the Criminal
Procedure & Investigations Act 1996, at 7 (unpublished Briefing Paper to explain how
unused material is collected, scheduled, and disclosed at the Crown Court) (on file
with the author), and of "anything that is inconsistent with an essential part of the
prosecution case or could weaken it in a significant way...." Crown Prosecution
Serv., Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, Joint Operational
Instructions: Disclosure of Unused Material § 3.19 (unpublished, March 24, 1997) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Joint Operational Instructions].
85. The Act permits adverse comment and/or inferences should the defendant fail
to give a timely defense statement, or give inconsistent defenses, or present a different
defense at trial. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 11. Other possible sanctions against the
defendant are contained in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which
provides sanctions relative to the defendant's silence or statements during police
questioning. See Peter Mirfield, Two Side-Effects of Sections 34 to 37 of the Criminal
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charge.86  Defense disclosure is compulsory in cases tried on
indictment, and optional in cases tried summarily; in both situations
the right to secondary disclosure is conditioned upon prior defense
disclosureY After the defendant has made disclosure, the prosecutor
must make secondary disclosure to the defense of material that "might
be reasonably expected to assist the accused's defence" as disclosed
by the defense statement.8s At both the primary and secondary
disclosure stages, the prosecutor applies the applicable tests to both
"non-sensitive" and "sensitive" materials.' Regarding the latter, the
Act preserves the judicially administered exception to disclosure
based on the common law doctrine of public interest immunity.'g
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 612, 612-14; Rosemary
Pattenden, Inferences from Silence, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 602, 607-10. The CPIA, which
makes clear that failure by police to abide by their duties will neither result in civil or
criminal liability nor in per se loss of the case, see CPIA, supra note 32, §§ 26(2)-(4),
has been criticized for including sanctions for noncompliance only against the
defense. See Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 24-25, 39-42. In Parliamentary debate,
the government had argued in favor of relying on the Bar's Code of Conduct and the
Code for Crown Prosecutors to ensure that correct ethical standards would be
applied. See Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at 79-80.
86. Defense disclosure is made by giving a statement to the court and prosecutor
setting forth: (a) in general terms the nature of the accused's defense; (b) the matters
on which he takes issue with the prosecution; and (c) for each matter, the reason why
he takes issue with the prosecution. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 5(6); Niblett, supra
note 31, at 236-38.
Before the Act, the defendant was obliged to disclose only alibi defenses and his
intention to present expert evidence. See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, ch. 80, § 11
(Eng.). Expanded defense disclosure under the CPIA was designed to narrow the
issues for trial, to avoid costly "fishing expeditions" by the defense and last minute
"ambush" defenses, and to allow the government to confine further disclosure to
material actually relevant to contested issues. See Runciman Comm'n Report, supra
note 47, at 96. Critics attacked the requirement of broadened defense disclosure as
shifting the burden of proof and undermining the presumption of innocence. See
Redmayne, supra note 54, at 84-86.
87. See CPIA, supra note 32, §§ 5-6.
88. CPIA, supra note 32, § 7(2)(a). Examples given by the CPS of such material
include relevant material that might: (a) assist the defense to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses, as to credit and/or to substance; (b) enable the defense to call
evidence or advance a line of enquiry or argument; or (c) explain or mitigate the
defendant's actions. See Joint Operational Instructions, supra note 84, at § 3A0. For
criticism of the secondary disclosure test, see Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 19-20,
and Niblett, supra note 31, at 239-41.
89. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
90. See CPIA, supra note 32, §§ 3(6), 7(5), 21(2); CPIA Code of Practice, supra
note 33, §§ 6.1, 6.12; supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. The Act arguably
extends the Public Interest Immunity exception beyond the narrow bounds previously
enforced in criminal cases. Thus, in especially sensitive circumstances, the prosecutor
can apply for pubic interest immunity from disclosure without notice to the defense.
Under the Act, however, the prosecutor need only obtain court approval for non-
disclosure of material that, in the prosecutor's view, satisfies the test for primary or
secondary disclosure. See Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at 67, 69-70 (noting that
one aim and effect of Act was to exempt much sensitive material from judicial
consideration); see also Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 222 (recognizing
that Code § 6.12, giving "examples" of material that may be considered sensitive,
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The new law radically restricts defense access to the unused
material possessed by the prosecution. The defendant's initial access
depends entirely upon prosecutorial screening of police files under a
subjective test.91 Secondary access also depends upon prosecutorial
screening, this time under an objective test that is subject, on
application by the defense, to judicial review. 2  Such secondary
access, however, is conditioned upon the defendant's disclosure of his
defense.93
From my inquiries it appears that the Act's essential premise-that
police and prosecutors can be relied upon to screen the unused
material for exculpatory evidence-remains deeply controversial. 4
To critics of the Act, the substitution of prosecutorial screening of
unused materials for defense screening gives the responsibility to
locate exculpatory evidence to those least capable, and least
motivated, to find it.9' For this reason, liberal critics contend that the
Act's pendulum has swung too far in favor of the government. They
complain that the Act gives the police primary control over disclosure,
that the police are neither able nor motivated to identify potentially
broadens the concept of public interest beyond that previously reflected in the
criminal case law).
91. Section 3 of the Act requires the prosecutor to disclose material "which in the
prosecutor's opinion might undermine the case for the prosecution." CPIA, supra
note 32, § 3(1)(a) (emphasis added). This subjective test is "designed to rule out the
possibility of judicial review," whereas the accused may "challenge prosecution
disclosure (or the lack of it) after secondary disclosure (s. 8)." Leng & Taylor, supra
note 31, at 13.
92. See Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 13. CPIA section 8 (and court rules)
permits a defendant who has given a defense statement, and who has reasonable
cause to believe that prosecution material exists that meets the test for secondary
disclosure, to seek a court order against the prosecutor. See Niblett, supra note 31, at
240-41. On the limitations of judicial review under the Act as an effective remedy for
incomplete prosecution disclosure, see Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 221-
23.
93. See supra note 86.
94. See, e.g., Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 216-18 (discussing the
revolutionary nature of the changes in disclosure law). Controversy also surrounds
the Act's provision for non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence based upon
public interest immunity. See id. at 221-23. Also, considerable uncertainty exists
regarding defense access to materials in the possession of third parties, including
private entities such as hospitals, and public agencies such as social service agencies.
95. See, e.g., Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at 79-80. Professor Sharpe further
explains the potential problem:
A fundamental concern underlying the CPIA is the significant onus placed
upon the police to discern, record, retain and reveal to the prosecutor any
information that "may be relevant" to the investigation.... Not only does
this assume a sound working knowledge of evidentiary principles on the part
of the police, it leads to an inverted "bottom up" decision-making structure
with low-ranking officers having the greatest amount of discretion. It is only
after police determinations have been made, that prosecutorial discretion in
determining whether the material might undermine the case for the
prosecution, or reasonably assist the accused's defence, comes into play.
Id. at 79.
1396 [Vol. 68
2000] EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN POLICE HANDS 1397
exculpatory material, and that prosecutors are too overworked to
monitor the police role.96 They also contend that the tests for primary
and secondary disclosure are defective, that the exceptions to
disclosure based on public interest immunity are too broad, and that
the procedural safeguards against improper grants of immunity are
inadequate. Consequently, critics predict that the Act's regime will
produce a new round of miscarriages of justice like those that
previously led the courts to give defense counsel direct access to the
police files.98 Police and prosecutors, in contrast, generally approve
the balance struck in the Act between protection of innocent
defendants and efficient prosecution of the guilty. They blame
problems in operation of the Act on the failure of other actors in the
system, including judges, to follow its dictates.9 They have also
protested the costly burden of paperwork required by PACE and the
CPIA.1°
From an American observer's point of view, however, another
96. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 164-67; Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note
31, at 225; Sharpe, Disclosure, at 71, 79-80; British Academy of Forensic Sciences,
Disclosure Under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (unpublished
papers presented at Seminar chaired by Lord Mackay of Clashfern at Gray's Inn,
Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with author); interview with defense solicitor in London, U.K.
(Apr. 14,1999).
97. The primary disclosure test has been criticized as overly vague, unworkable,
and essentially indistinguishable from the test for secondary disclosure. See Leng &
Taylor, supra note 31, at 12-15; Sharpe, Disclosure, supra note 71, at 71-73. Also,
because the test is subjective, and therefore may be insulated from court review,
prosecutors have little incentive to construe it broadly. See Redmayne, supra note 54,
at 81. The Runciman Commission had recommended much broader primary
disclosure of:
all material relevant to the offence or to the offender or to the surrounding
circumstances of the case, whether or not the prosecution intend to rely
upon that material.... In addition, the prosecution should inform the
defence at this stage of the existence of any other material obtained during
the course of the inquiry into the offence in question.
Runciman Comm'n Report, supra note 47, at 95-96.
98. See interviews with defense solicitors in Birmingham, U.K. (Apr. 13 & Apr.
21, 1999); supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
99. Police complain about the lack of compliance by defense lawyers who fail to
provide detailed defense statements, and by judges who, without requiring such
statements, order the prosecution to give the defense blanket access to police iles.
See interview with defense solicitor in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999); interview with
Principal Crown Prosecutor, Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters,
London, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999); interview with Superintendent R.K.
Golding, Police Representative, Trial Issues Group, CPS Headquarters, London, in
London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999). Prosecutors blame the police for inadequately
screening the unused material for exculpatory material. As a result, judges distrust
the adequacy of police screening, and pressure prosecutors to allow the defense direct
access to police files, in order to do the screening themselves.
100. See interviews with staff at West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters, Training
and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999); see also Alan Mackie
et al., Preparing the Prosecution Case, 1999 Crim. L. Rev. 460, 462 (reporting that
police in 1993 asserted they were being "strangled by paperwork" as the result of
PACE and file-keeping requirements).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
aspect of the English system is noteworthy: in serious, contested
cases, the Act gives prosecutors access to police-prepared schedules
that list all relevant material gathered in the investigation. Except for
separate schedules of "sensitive" materials, the defense also receives
copies of these schedules.1"' In deciding disclosure issues, the
prosecutor has the right to inspect all of the materials listed in the
schedules. These formal mechanisms for revealing the fruits of police
investigation, both inculpatory and exculpatory, to the prosecutor,
contrast starkly with the informal, low-visibility and unstructured links
between police and prosecution that characterize American practice.
2. Duties of the Police
The prosecutor's disclosure duties under the Act apply to material
in the prosecutor's possession, or which has been revealed to him by
police investigators."° The CPIA Code of Practice1"3 describes the
police duties to ensure that the prosecutor becomes aware of all
relevant fruits of the investigation. These duties consist of general
responsibilities, the duty to investigate exculpatory as well as
inculpatory leads, and the duties to record, retain, and reveal relevant
information to the prosecutor. We shall discuss these duties in turn,
both as they are defined by law and as they appear to work in practice.
a. General Responsibilities
In every criminal investigation the chief of police must designate an
officer to function as the disclosure officer."° The officer in charge of
an investigation must ensure that proper procedures are in place for
recording and retaining investigative material, 5 and that all relevant
material is made available to the disclosure officer."° The disclosure
officer is responsible for examining investigative material retained by
the police, revealing it to the prosecutor, and formally certifying that
he has done this. In routine cases, the investigator and disclosure
officer might often be the same person. In a major inquiry, where
many officers might be brought in to the investigation, a separate
person will usually be appointed disclosure officer, and all the
101. Of course, access to the schedules is not the same as access to items listed on
the schedule. The defense may only examine the actual items themselves by consent
of the prosecution, or, after disclosure of the defense statement, by court order under
CPIA section 8. See infra text accompanying notes 160-73.
102. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3.2.
103. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33.
104. See id. §§ 3.1-3.6; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 42-43. Civilian employees
of the department may also serve in this capacity. The chief must also designate
officers to serve as the officer in charge of the investigation, and as the investigator.
See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 34, §§ 3.1-3.3.
105. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 34, § 2.1.
106. See id. § 3.3.
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investigating team members will funnel information to him.101 In
some forces, once the investigation is complete and a charge filed, the
investigators will hand over responsibility for disclosure to an
"administrative support unit" within the force."s
b. Duty to Investigate Exculpatory as well as Inculpatory Leads
Miscarriages of justice can result from one-sided investigations
because they ignore evidence that might contradict belief in the prime
suspect's guilt.1" To avoid this risk, section 23(1)(a) of the Act
provides, for the first time, that police must take "all reasonable
steps ... for the purposes of the investigation,""' and the Code
requires investigators to "pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry,
whether these point towards or away from the suspect.""'
The practical impact of this new duty remains to be seen.
According to Roger Leng, this requirement, added late to the Bill,
might be seen "as a cynical attempt to appease the opposition whilst
falling short of enforceability by the courts."' 2  Several informants
107. See id. § 3.1-3.3; interview with Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K. (Apr. 6,
1999).
108. These units, also known as Criminal Justice Support Units ("CJSU"), were
created to relieve uniformed officers of the administrative burdens of final file
preparation. They may be staffed by civilians. See Michael Maguire & Clive Norris,
The Conduct and Supervision of Criminal Investigations 36 (Royal Comm'n on Crim.
Justice, Research Study No. 5, 1992); see also John Baldwin & Adrian Hunt,
Prosecutors Advising in Police Stations, 1998 Crim. L. Rev. 521,531-32 (discussing the
difficulties faced by administrative support units); interviews with staff at West
Mercia Constabulary Headquarters, Training and Development, in Hindlip,
Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
109. See Barrie Irving & Colin Dunnighan, Human Factors in the Quality Control
of CID Investigations 12 (Royal Comm'n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 21,
1993) (describing four stages of police investigation: first, police gather evidence to
define one or more prime suspects; second, police identify and arrest suspects; third,
police establish a case against the suspect sufficient to meet the test of prosecution;
fourth, if police fail at step three, they repeat it; if they are partially successful, they
try to find more evidence).
110. CPIA, supra note 32, § 23(1)(a).
111. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 3.4 ("What is reasonable in each case
will depend on the particular circumstances."). This requirement implements
recommendations of the Royal Commission. See Runciman Comm'n Report, supra
note 47, ch. 2, para. 13 (stating that even if a suspect has already confessed, police
should interview "as many witnesses to the offence as practicable, including any
whom the suspect suggests may be able to exonerate him or her"); cf Standards
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.11(c) (3d. ed. 1992)
("A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence because he or she
believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused."); Note, Toward a
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investigation: A Step Beyond Brady, supra
note 27, at 842-48 (discussing police duty to investigate under the Sixth Amendment).
In the United States, a defendant may elicit evidence at trial to establish the
inadequacy of the police investigation in failing to pursue exculpatory leads. See
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 708 N.E.2d 658,662 (Mass. 1999).
112. Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note 31, at 224.
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described this provision as unenforceable, and therefore unlikely to
affect police behavior.113 However, as Mr. Leng notes, a court might
exclude evidence'1 4 or stay proceedings'1 5 if police disregard the duty.
Also, the defense might raise questions before the jury as to why the
police did not explore alternative hypotheses. My interviews with
police suggest that the fear of adverse consequences at trial might
motivate police in serious cases to comply with the duty, as in the
following case.
A woman was charged with the stabbing murder of the man who
was driving the car in which she was a passenger. She claimed that a
car with two men had pursued the victim's car, and one of the
pursuers fought with and stabbed the victim. She described the route
and the two men. Because witnesses saw the victim's car en route
with no car in pursuit, the police doubted the woman's story. But the
police published her description of the two men, appealing for public
help. Members of the public phoned in the names of seventy suspects
fitting the descriptions. Because the police feared cross-examination
at trial regarding why they did not pursue this "reasonable line of
inquiry," the police investigated all seventy, and excluded them all. 116
The police might have investigated the defendant's claim even if they
had no duty to do so under the Act, but the existence of the duty
might give more strength to a defense argument at trial that the
investigation was defective.
The requirement that police "pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry"
also invites the defense proactively to request that the police
investigate particular alternative hypotheses.1 7 In cases in which the
113. See interviews with Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K. (Apr. 6, 1999);
interview with Principal Crown Prosecutor, Casework Services Division, CPS
Headquarters, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
114. Section 78 of PACE authorizes courts to refuse to admit prosecution evidence
if, "having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse
effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 78 (Eng.). The defense might argue for
exclusion, Leng suggests, "where the accused's ability to answer [the prosecution]
evidence is substantially prejudiced as a result of the failure of the police to follow up
available lines of inquiry favouring the accused." Leng, Defence Strategies, supra note
31, at 229.
115. Courts have the power to stay the proceedings if, as the result of government
abuse of the process, the accused cannot receive a fair trial. See Leng, Defence
Strategies, supra note 31, at 229-30.
116. The police also recorded the statement of another witness, who at the time of
the "pursuit" heard two cars race past his window, which faced a road near, but not
on, the route that the defendant had described. This was disclosed to the defense
which, without notice, argued at trial that the defendant and victim had followed this
other route. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q.,
in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
117. A defense lawyer predicted that defense solicitors in child abuse prosecutions,
who lack the ability to compel production of child welfare agency records, will request
the police to "do their job" by reviewing the records for exculpatory material. See
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police believe the grounds for such a request are baseless, they might
be placed in a dilemma: whether to spend scarce investigative
resources or risk embarrassment at trial for refusing to take
"reasonable" investigative steps.118 This requirement may therefore
lend itself to strategic manipulation by the defense. On the other
hand, by giving the defense a modest call on finite investigative
resources largely controlled by the state, the Act may enhance the
likelihood of a more balanced, impartial investigation. Also, to
forestall abuse, the prosecution may look to the trial judge to exclude
questions or arguments referring to police failure to take
"unreasonable" investigative steps.119
c. Duty to Record Potentially Exculpatory Information
Since 1992, administrative guidelines issued by the Crown
Prosecution Service have required the police to maintain schedules of
all investigative materials coming into their possession and provide
copies of the schedules to the CPS.20 The guidelines listed a number
of categories of material that should be retained and included in the
schedules, including notes of interviews with actual or potential
witnesses, suspects, or defendants, statements taken from potential
witnesses "whether or not they assist the prosecution case,"
documents containing a description of the alleged criminal by a
potential witness, crime reports, custody records, communications
with forensic witnesses, and materials casting doubt upon the
reliability or consistency of potential witnesses, or upon the reliability
of a confession."' Relevant information received orally had to be
recorded and included on the schedule.'2
The 1996 Act gave legislative force to this previous duty established
by the guidelines: police must record, retain, and reveal to the
prosecutor in schedule form, all "material"'" - that "may be relevant to
the investigation." 124  The Act further defines "material" as
interview with defense solicitor in London, U.K. (Apr. 12, 1999).
118. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in
Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
119. See Donald A. Dripps, Relevant But Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence:
Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. Cal. L Rev.
1389, 1399 (1996) (arguing that a judge's power to exclude prejudicial exculpatory
evidence safeguards state interest in accurate fact-finding against the danger of
irrational acquittals).
120. See Guinness Advice, supra note 53, at 124-25. The Guinness Advice is also
discussed supra at notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
121. See Guinness Advice, supra note 53, at 125.
122. See id. at 126.
123. "Material" includes both information and objects. See CPIA Code of Practice,
supra note 33, § 2.1.
124. Id. §§ 4.1-4.4; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 43-44. Recording may be in
writing or electronic form, and must be done contemporaneously, i.e., "at the time it is
obtained or as soon as practicable after that time." CPIA Code of Practice, supra note
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information that appears to have "some bearing on any offence under
investigation or any person being investigated, or on the surrounding
circumstances of the case, unless it is incapable of having any impact
on the case...."' When relevant, police must also record negative
information, such as a witness's failure to observe an alleged
occurrence.
126
The importance of the recording requirement cannot be overstated:
unless exculpatory evidence is recorded, it may be lost forever to a
suspect who later seeks to establish his innocence. Opinions differ on
the extent to which the police actually comply with this duty under the
Act; it is easy, after all, not to write something down. Until credible
studies are conducted of investigation under the Act, the extent of
compliance cannot be known. However, certain observations of the
English experience can be made.
First, the recording duty conflicts with a strong police tendency not
to write down information that the police do not want disclosed. 127
This tension is most likely to arise in cases involving sensitive
information, such as the existence of an informant. The Act requires
police to reveal the existence of relevant, sensitive, unused material to
the prosecutor, who, if the material is otherwise disclosable, must
apply for court authorization to withhold it from the defense. 8
Second, in complex criminal investigations involving the use of
HOLMES, 29 comprehensive records of relevant information are
made and preserved. This illustrates the incidental benefit to
defendants of a system adopted in order to enhance investigative
efficiency by requiring records to be made of "everything" learned in
an investigation.
Third, several of my informants believed that the Act had made
police more conscious of their duty to record and reveal exculpatory
evidence.' They believed that training programs, reinforced by the
33, §§ 4.1, 4.4.
125. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 2.1.
126. See id. § 4.3.
127. See interview with senior Crown Prosecutor, in Abingdon, U.K. (Apr. 18,
1999).
128. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 3(6).
129. "HOLMES" records are described in Appendix A, infra notes 354-67 and
accompanying text.
130. As one experienced Crown Prosecutor said, the Act "concentrates the police
mind on unused material." As a result, the police record more than they did
previously, and some of what they record favors the defense. See interview with senior
Crown Prosecutor, in Abingdon, U.K (Apr. 18, 1999).
However, police often report "negative" evidence in ambiguous terms that conceal
its true import. For example, in a burglary case police testified that "fingerprint
checks at point of entry were negative." Both prosecutors and defense counsel
thought that this meant that police had found no prints. In fact, prints had been
found, but they turned out not to belong to the defendant, nor to any other known
person (the defendant's prints were on the items taken in the burglary, but he claimed
he had found the items on the street). When this fact came out after trial, the CPS did
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threat of disciplinary sanctions, are causing police to internalize the
norms established by the Act. My visit to a regional police training
facility" illustrated this process. Because it struck me as remarkable
compared to the training that I suspect occurs in most American
police academies, I describe it in some detail.
I attended a regularly scheduled class on the CPIA for eight
probationary police constables who had served as police officers for
eighteen months." All of the officers had experience investigating
and preparing files in their own criminal cases. In addition, each had
at some time been assigned to a special administrative unit in her
force, whose task was to prepare case files and evidence for
submission to the CPS. 33  After I was given an opportunity to
introduce myself to the class and explain my interest, the instructor
led a discussion on the group's understanding of the Act and their
experiences under it.
Discussion focused on the duty to pursue, record, and retain
"negative" evidence. Several participants related instances in which
they had encountered and recorded such evidence. One told of a case
in which "every witness gave a different account." Accordingly, he
submitted their statements to the prosecutor, along with comments on
their unreliability. Another told of a "violent disorder" case in which
two lineups were held but the suspect was not identified; he had
recorded this."3 A third told how, in an assault case, bloody boots
were seized, bagged incorrectly in plastic, and not promptly sent for
blood analysis. As a result, they were useless as evidence. The officer
not oppose defendant's appeal of his conviction. According to my informant, the
police must be trained to report more specifically what they mean by a -negative"
investigative result. See interview with Principal Crown Prosecutor, Casework
Services Division, CPS Headquarters, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
131. The training occurred at West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters. The West
Mercia region is made up of rural areas and small towns, and encompasses
Shropshire, Worcestershire, and Herefordshire. The region's largest city has a
population of 200,000.
132. New police constables spend their first two years of service as probationers.
133. These are known as Criminal Justice Support Units (-CJSUs") or
Administrative Support Units ("ASUs"). In forces where they exist, the CJSUs
assume the functions of the disclosure officer once the investigation has been
completed and the charge filed. These units were created to relieve uniformed
officers of the administrative burdens of final file preparation. See interviews with
various staff at West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters, Training and Development,
in Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999); see also Baldwin & Hunt, supra note 108,
at 531-32 (discussing difficulties encountered by the ASUs); Maguire & Norris, supra
note 108, at 36 (same).
134. I do not know why this officer, who was apparently conducting the
investigation, was also involved in the identification procedures. See supra notes 64-67
and accompanying text (PACE requires independent identification officer to
administer identification procedures and record results). Also, because PACE
entitles the defense lawyer to be present at the lineup, the lawyer would know of the
non-identification; therefore, police recording of the fact would not greatly benefit the
defense. I am grateful to Roger Leng for bringing the last point to my attention.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
recorded the "whole shambles" about the boots in the file. While
none of these police actions in themselves is remarkable, it is
significant that the participants saw their actions as examples of
compliance with their duty to record, retain, and reveal information
that undermines the prosecution case.
At some point in the discussion, the instructor played devil's
advocate: "You have 52 cards. Two are the wrong color. What do
you do with the two? You have a statement that helps the defense.
You have seen the victim. You know that the defendant is guilty.
Why not tear up the statement?" The group's responses included
comments like, "Because it's a legal document, you can't;" "It
wouldn't be fair;" "It's not our job to be judge and jury; at the end of
the day, we never know who did it;" "If you start with a minor breach
of the rules, where do you stop?" Some brought up the possible
sanctions for failure to comply with the Act's commands. 35 Accusing
them of talking like boy scouts and girl scouts, the instructor asked
whether they had not seen more experienced officers "bend" the
rules. A couple reported that other officers sometimes bent PACE
rules restricting the power to stop and search suspects, but none
reported seeing the CPIA rules "bent."
The class then watched a videotape of a simulated crime. A young
man snatched the victim's purse as she was standing on the street, and
ran. The victim and an eyewitness described the perpetrator to an
officer at the scene. A suspect who fit the descriptions was
questioned, and his photograph was identified both by the victim and
the eyewitness. The victim telephoned the police on the next day and
retracted her identification-it "happened so fast," she "couldn't be
sure." Must her retraction be reduced to writing? Yes. Why? It is
relevant information, which must be scheduled, supplied to the
prosecutor, and flagged as meeting the test of "primary disclosure"-
i.e., it undermines the case for the prosecution.1 6  After primary
disclosure is made to the defense, the video continues with the
defendant submitting a "defense statement" claiming alibi: he was in
a certain caf6 with a friend at the time of the incident. The defense
statement also blames the crime on youths from a certain housing
project. The police interview the proprietor of a shop adjacent to the
scene of the crime who confirms that youths from that project had
135. The sanctions raised in class discussion included losing the chance to convict a
guilty accused, internal discipline, and criminal liability. In fact, the Act insulates
police from civil or criminal liability simply for violating their duties under the Code.
See CPIA, supra note 32, § 26(2). Training materials mention the following possible
consequences for failures to comply: release of the accused from the duty to make
defense disclosure, acquittal of the accused, reversal of a conviction, awarding of costs
against the prosecution, and disciplinary proceedings. See Joint Operational
Instructions, supra note 84, § 1.24.
136. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 7.3 (requiring police to give the
prosecutor a copy of "any material casting doubt on the reliability' of a witness").
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been hanging around his shop shortly before the crime. Must the
police record and reveal that statement to the prosecutor? Yes,
because it is relevant (though "negative") material. Also, because it
"might be reasonably expected to assist the [accused's defence]"'3 as
disclosed by the defense statement, it should be flagged to the
prosecutor as meeting the test of secondary disclosure. Further
investigation destroys the defendant's alibi: the owner of the cafd
where the defendant claims to have been tells the police that the caf6
was closed for renovations on the day of the crime.
The value of training such as I observed is difficult to determine,
but there is good reason to doubt its efficacy. As Mike McConville
and colleagues have shown, the police possess overwhelming power to
magnify and create inculpatory facts, and to suppress exculpatory
facts.138 Many reasons exist for them to do so in the service of their
own institutional goals and constraints.1 9 For example, resource
limitations commonly create pressure for speedy closure of
investigations."4 Also, police are vulnerable to "confirmatory bias,"
the well-known general tendency to "seek out or selectively attend to
information which confirms what they believe or 'know' to be the
case," while ignoring or dismissing information that contradicts their
theory.141 Also, especially in high profile cases, investigators may be
137. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 8.2.
138. In the words of Mike McConville:
Of course it is commonly thought that evidence is 'discovered' by the police
and that such discoveries are the mark of a good investigator.... [11n a very
real sense, the police construct evidence .... The police have, at a most
fundamental level, the ability to select facts, to reject facts, to not seek facts,
to evaluate facts and to generate facts. Facts, in this sense, are not objective
entities which exist independently of the social actors but are created by
them.
McConville et al., supra note 31, at 56. Through case file reviews and interviews with
officials, the authors studied the processing of over 1000 cases by the police,
prosecutors, and courts. See id. at 1. The authors argue that "the creation of evidence
in one way or another is not a deviant police act but a standard form of production.
The processes of production... are all-pervasive." Id. at 87.
139. The police "create" facts to justify case decisions that foster police goals such
as maintenance of public order and police authority, satisfaction of the wishes of
influential segments of community, and insulation of the police from criticism. See id.
at 25-29, 65, 97-98.
140. "Records... are always directed towards closure. The privileged status
accorded police accounts generally ensures that closure takes place by suppressing
and delegitimating alternative accounts." Id. at 81; see also Roger Ede & Eric
Shepherd, Active Defence: A Lawyer's Guide to Police and Defence Investigation
and Prosecution and Defence Disclosure in Criminal Cases 64-65 (1998) (discussing
police bias toward "attaching criminality to an individual" whom police believe has
committed a crime).
141. See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 64; Randy Borum et al., Improving
Clinical Judgment and Decision Making in Forensic Evaluation, 21 J. Psychiatry & L
35,47-48 (1993). McConville and his colleagues describe how this occurs in practice:
In constructing cases to fit the decisions the police wish to make, the police
adopt an adversarial role. Their job is to build the strongest possible case
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motivated to build a case against a suspect. As one experienced
defense lawyer said, "I trust the constable on the street to write things
down. But in a big case, involving the CID, trying to build a case
against a suspect, that's who I don't trust."'42
All of these tendencies are supported by the culture of policing,
which discourages "rocking the boat" by "question[ing] the quality or
propriety of other officers' conduct, decision-making, actions and
attitudes." 14 3 In an attempt to counter the tendency to build one-sided
cases against presumptively guilty suspects, since early 1993 all police
in England have been trained in the "PEACE" model of investigative
interviewing.1" Adopted jointly by the Home Office and the
Association of Chief Police Officers, PEACE obligates police, when
taking statements, "to confront contradictions or anomalies and,
where these cannot be resolved, to include these in the document-
not to edit them out." '45 Unfortunately, despite extensive PEACE
training, officers' "witness interviewing remains the Achilles' heel of
police investigations.1' 46 Empirically, Roger Ede and Eric Shepherd
note that "[r]esearch, particularly that based upon recordings of
officers interviewing witnesses, shows that witness interviewing and its
product-witness statements-leave a lot to be desired.' 1 47  Among
the reasons for this conclusion, the authors mention the disinclination
of police to take full notes or use tape recording. This enables police
to prevent later scrutiny of manipulative interviewing techniques
designed to produce "good statements," i.e., statements that are
plausible, consistent, and inculpatory. 14
8
against the defendant. Naturally they do not choose to help defendants, by
drawing out their legal defences or emotional problems for instance, but
they are not required to by any law or set of guidelines.
McConville et al, supra note 31, at 181; see also id. at 77 (noting that in police
interrogation, "[wihere the suspect asserts innocence or introduces evidence which
would support a defence, this is generally ignored").
142. Interview with defense lawyer, in Birmingham, U.K. (Apr. 13, 1999). "CID"
refers to the detective unit.
143. Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 67. Opinions differ as to whether, or to
what extent, the culture of policing in England has changed since the introduction of
PACE in 1984. One police official reported that officers who did not like the new
rules left the police, and those that stayed learned to accept and obey the new rules.
See interview with training instructor at West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters,
Training and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
144. "PEACE" is an acronym standing for different stages of the interview process.
See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 40. The training consists of a five-day course.
See id. at 60. For further details regarding the requirements of PEACE, see id. at 40-
50; see also id. at 59 (citing Police Staff College, Bramshill, A Guide to Interviewing
(1996). as a source of PEACE guidelines).
145. Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 79.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 79-82. The authors also criticize police practices in obtaining
descriptions of suspects from witnesses, and in failing to take statements from
witnesses whose information would not support the police theory of the case. See id.
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While these reports are discouraging, it does not necessarily follow
that training in PEACE guidelines and CPIA requirements is not
worth the cost. The crucial questions are whether it is possible to
heighten police sensitivity to the risk of wrongful convictions and to
the value of recording negative information, and whether sufficient
incentives can be created to induce police to follow such recording
requirements. The answers to these difficult questions do not exist. 4 9
It does appear, however, that training both in the classroom and in the
field strongly reinforces the Act's detailed normative framework for
the recording of exculpatory evidence.'-' To my knowledge, neither
such a detailed framework nor any comparable training effort exists in
the United States.151
d. The Police Duty to Retain Exculpatory Evidence
Police must retain recorded information that "may be relevant to
the investigation,'"" including the following categories of potentially
relevant material:u 3 police reports, police notebook entries, custody
at 83-86.
149. McConville and his colleagues are highly skeptical of the proposition that a
change in the law can bring about change in police investigating and reporting
practices. See McConville et al., supra note 31, at 198-208; see also Russell Hogg, The
Politics of Criminal Investigation, in Social Theory and Legal Politics 120, 126 (Gary
Wickham ed., 1987) (denying that law "can direct police work in any meaningful
sense"). If, however, one can alter police goals, their conduct in recording and
reporting investigations will follow. See Brown, PACE Ten Years On, supra note 31,
at 243-56 (concluding from studies of the impact of PACE that new legal rules can
alter existing police practices provided they are clear, accompanied by adequate
training, backed up by effective sanctions and supervision, and that the public is
aware of its rights); Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive
Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 389, 429-30 (1999)
(advocating use of training and mentoring programs to change police attitudes toward
acceptability of lying); see also Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Mll. L. Rev. 363, 392-400 (arguing that entity liability of
police departments promotes systemic deterrence, achieved through training and
internal discipline).
150. Verbal expressions of opinion by probationers in a training class, in the
presence of a stranger like myself, are obviously not reliable predictors of behavior on
the job. Nonetheless, I was impressed with the honesty, sincerity, and maturity of the
group members. Granted, they were an unrepresentative group on a number of
counts. They had operated under the CPIA since entering the force; officers with
longer service might have had more resistant attitudes. Also, police working in urban
environments, where drugs, gangs, and more serious crimes are prevalent, could be
expected to view the Act differently than the rural and small-town police I met. This
distinction might also apply to detectives (CID), as opposed to constables.
151. I am aware of no empirical study of police training in the United States that
considers training in the duty to record exculpatory evidence. But see Fisher, Just the
Facts, supra note 17, at 26-27 & n.132 (reviewing training materials from six police
departments in several states that suggest that police are formally instructed to record
"all relevant evidence" in their reports, but given a stronger, implicit message to
record only inculpatory evidence).
152. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 5.1.
153. See id. § 5.4.
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records, information from tapes or telephone messages containing
descriptions of an offense or offender, witness statements-both the
final versions and any draft versions "where their content differs from
the final version"-records of interviews with actual or potential
witnesses and suspects, communications between police and experts,
"any material casting doubt on the reliability of a confession... [or] a
witness," and any other material that might undermine the case for
the prosecution.14 In the words of one police official, "we must keep
everything," including "jottings before an interview and after an
interview." '55 The Code also specifies the length of time for which
material must be retained; for incarcerated convicts, the material must
be kept until the person is released from custody.5 6
As a practical matter, the need to save "everything" relevant to the
investigation of Crown Court cases, and of contested magistrates'
court cases, imposes a demanding and potentially costly standard. 57
Courts can dismiss prosecutions if police failure to retain potentially
relevant material prejudices the defendant's ability to get a fair trial.
For example, courts have dismissed cases for "abuse of process"
because video recordings from cameras monitoring downtown street
activity were taped over or lost before the trials of defendants charged
with crimes on adjacent streets. 58
e. The Duty to Reveal Information to the Prosecutor
(i) The Legal Framework
After a suspect has been charged, the police must transmit to the
prosecutor a file containing the evidence in support of the prosecution
case. 59 At the same time, they must reveal to the prosecutor all
additional "unused material" that may be relevant to the
investigation."6 This is done in the following manner: In all Crown
Court cases, and in contested magistrates' court cases, the disclosure
officer must prepare a schedule describing each item of relevant
material retained by the police)61 Separate schedules are prepared for
154. See id. §§ 5.1-5.4; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 43-45.
155. Interviews with staff at West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters, Training
and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
156. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 5.8
157. Among other things, conformance with the requirement could require, over
time, the building and maintenance of costly storage facilities. I heard conflicting
accounts as to whether this was a serious problem for the police.
158. See interview with Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K. (Apr. 6, 1999).
159. See supra Part I.C.2.
160. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 7.1-7.5. Like the prosecutor's
disclosure duties, the police duties are continuing. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 9; CPIA
Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 8.1-8.3.
161. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, §§ 6.6-6.8, 7.1-7.5. The forms and
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"sensitive" materials" that may be privileged from disclosure, and
"non-sensitive" materials. 16 The scheduled items must be numbered
consecutively and described in sufficient detail to enable the
prosecutor to decide whether she needs to inspect the material before
determining whether or not it should be disclosed to the defense.,1
As to items listed in the schedule of sensitive material, the disclosure
officer must also state the reasons why in the public interest the
material should not be disclosed.16
In addition to providing the prosecutor with schedules of unused
sensitive and non-sensitive materials, the police are required to give
her copies of particular materials.1" These materials include: records
of the first description of a suspect given to police by a potential
witness, information given by the accused providing an "explanation
for the offence," any material casting doubt on the reliability of a
confession or witness, and other materials that the investigator
believes are subject to primary disclosure because they might
undermine the case for the prosecution."6 On a special form, the
disclosure officer must alert the prosecutor to those items that he
believes might satisfy the tests for primary and secondary disclosure,
and give reasons for his beliefs.' s The prosecutor may also ask the
police to submit specified retained material to her for inspection, in
order to decide whether such material should be disclosed to the
defense.
After reviewing and approving the schedules prepared by the
police, the prosecutor must sign and forward the schedule of non-
sensitive materials to the defense, together with copies of any
materials the prosecutor chooses to provide as primary disclosure.' 69
In order to receive secondary disclosure, the defendant must then
submit a defense statement, which the prosecutor must forward to the
schedules by which the police transmit mandated information to the CPS are uniform
for all of England and Wales. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. The
schedules indicate the location of each listed item. See infra Appendix C (sample
forms for sensitive and non-sensitive material).
162- See Schedule of Sensitive Material (Form MG 6D), reproduced in Appendix
C, infra.
163. See Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused Material (Form MG 6C), reproduced
in Appendix C, infra.
164. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 6.9.
165. See id § 6.12. The Code gives examples of material that might, depending on
the circumstances, be too sensitive to disclose. Examples range from material relating
to national security or received from foreign sources or intelligence agencies to
material "given in confidence" or which reveals "directly or indirectly, techniques and
methods relied upon by a police officer in the course of a criminal investigation." Id.
166. See id § 7.3.
167. See id
16& See id. § 7.2.
169. In practice, the defense receives the schedules, in accordance with the
apparent legislative intent, but the statutory language is not crystal clear. See CPIA,
supra note 32, § 4; Leng & Taylor, supra note 31, at 36.
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police disclosure officer. 170 The disclosure officer must then review
the retained material in police files and "draw the attention of the
prosecutor to any material which might reasonably be expected to
assist the defence disclosed by the accused; and he must reveal it to
him."'' Both when the disclosure officer initially sends the schedules
of unused material to the prosecutor, and after he reviews the files
again in light of the defense statement, he must certify in writing to
the prosecutor that "to the best of his knowledge and belief, all
material which has been retained and made available to him has been
revealed to the prosecutor.' 7 2
(ii) Implementation of the Act
Most informants, including every prosecutor I interviewed,
criticized the police for failing to perform their duties properly. 7 The
police responsibilities, which are at the heart of the disclosure scheme,
involve four major tasks: (1) describing scheduled materials in
sufficient detail; (2) providing the prosecutor with copies of certain
materials; (3) accurately distinguishing between sensitive and non-
sensitive materials; and (4) identifying material that should be
disclosed to the defense. In practice, reportedly, the police often fall
short in each task: police descriptions on the schedules tend to be
general and uninformative; required copies of records such as first
descriptions and suspects' explanations are not provided; 74 non-
sensitive materials, if favorable to the defense, are often scheduled as
sensitive;175 sensitive materials are not properly scheduled; and
materials that should be identified as subject to primary or secondary
disclosure are not so identified.
A prosecutor described the following illustrative case to me.'76 A
170. See Joint Operational Instructions, supra note 84, § 3.35.
171. CPIA Code of Practice, supra note 33, § 8.2.
172. Id. § 9.1. Police are also required to check whether certain prosecution
witnesses have previous convictions, and reveal them to the prosecutor. But whether
such convictions should be disclosed is a decision in each case for the prosecutor,
applying the tests for primary and secondary disclosure. See Joint Operational
Instructions, supra note 84, Annex B (entitled "Previous convictions and cautions of
prosecution witnesses").
173. For critical accounts of the Act in operation, as well as criticisms of the Act as
impracticably "perfectionist," see British Academy of Forensic Sciences, Disclosure
Under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, supra note 31, passin.
174. See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 140, at 92-93 (noting that police keep CPS "in
the dark" by failing to disclose questionnaires completed in house-to-house inquiries,
computer printouts of police communications, full crime reports, full transcripts of
witness and suspect interviews, and other original materials).
175. In one case, for example, a tape recording of the defendant's telephone call
requesting an ambulance for the victim suggested, by the tone of his voice, that he was
not the assailant. The police listed the tape on the "sensitive" schedule. See interview
with Principal Crown Prosecutor, Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters, in
London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
176. See interview with Crown Prosecutor, in Coventry, U.K. (Apr. 6, 1999).
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"serial wife abuser" was charged with multiple counts of assault, false
imprisonment, and witness intimidation, all allegedly committed
against his wife. Form MG 6C, the Schedule of Non-Sensitive Unused
Material,1" contained only the following entries:
Item No. Description Location
1 Officer's PNB [police notebook] With Officers
2 Crime File 78  --
3 Person in Custody Sheet M3 Cell Block
4 Fingerprints and Photo Lloyd House
The accompanying file contained no copies of any of the listed
material, nor any indication of what information was contained in the
police notebook or other scheduled materials. Form MG 6E, the
Disclosure Officer's Report to the prosecutor that must list the
scheduled items that appear to undermine the prosecution case or to
assist the defense, as well as copies of materials that are required to be
supplied to the prosecutor in every case, was left blank. However, on
a "Confidential Information" form, 179 the police recited background
information indicating a long history in which defendant's wife would
accuse the defendant of abuse, then retract, claiming that she had
started the fight or making some other excuse. The police believed
that the defendant's wife was frightened of the defendant. This
history should have been included on either the schedule of non-
sensitive, or of sensitive, unused material, but was not. On receipt of
the file, the Crown Prosecutor asked the police to submit all of the
unused material in the case. When I spoke with her, she was waiting
for the files, which she expected would include copies of all records
pertaining to domestic violence in the family, including social welfare
and medical records.
Other practitioners confirmed as typical the pattern illustrated by
the above case. According to most informants, the police rarely flag
unused material as meeting the test of primary or secondary
disclosure. Thus, the principals of two large firms of solicitors, who
defend many serious criminal cases, each told me that they had never
received any material in the primary disclosure stage.'" One of them
reported that, when he gives the prosecution a defense statement, he
normally gets nothing in secondary disclosure unless he "pushes."' 8'
177. See this form infra Appendix C, showing information supplied in a different
case.
178. This refers to the police file containing all investigative materials in the case.
179. Form MG 6.
180. See interviews with defense solicitors, in London, U.K. (Apr. 12, 1999);
interviews with defense solicitors, in Birmingham, U.K. (Apr. 13, 1999).
181. According to this solicitor, he could count instances of secondary disclosure
"on the fingers of one hand." Interview with defense solicitor in Birmingham, U.K
2000]
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Because the police fail to describe the scheduled materials in
sufficient detail to allow prosecutors to decide whether the material
merits disclosure, and do not normally supply copies of the scheduled
materials, the burden remains on the prosecutor to ask the police for
more detailed scheduling of and/or access to the underlying materials.
Whether the Crown Prosecutor will take this initiative in a particular
case, or instead, relying on the police response, will simply sign the
form letter stating that no material subject to primary or secondary
disclosure exists, depends upon the prosecutor's conscientiousness and
workload," as well as the nature and seriousness of the case.
In many cases the thoroughness of disclosure review also depends on
the skill and persistence of the defense lawyer in demanding access to
particular materials, or alternatively, the prosecutor's assurance that
she has personally reviewed the unused materials and determined that
they do not satisfy the criteria for disclosure. Faced with such
demands, prosecutors might request more complete and detailed
schedules. In a case in which HOLMES183 was used, these would
consist of computer-generated printouts listing all investigative actions,
documents, and other data. Prosecutors might themselves inspect the
underlying documents, or might instruct the police to give the defense
lawyer full access to the police file, minus any potentially sensitive
materials. In some locales, judges will prevail upon the Crown to give
the defense such access, even-in flagrant disregard of the Act-when
the defense has not supplied a defense statement. 114 The willingness of
some prosecutors and judges to allow the defense direct access to the
unused materials despite the requirements imposed by the new law
reflects a belief that the prosecutor lacks the time, and the police lack
the ability and/or the motivation, to properly identify exculpatory
(Apr. 13, 1999).
182. Interviews with two Crown Prosecutors in the same office revealed markedly
different approaches to their duties under the Act. One of the prosecutors said that
he would never sign such a disclosure form without requesting and studying all of the
scheduled materials, such as property slips, crime reports, custody records, command
and control logs, and PACE premises search logs. If the last item lists eight officers
who were present at the search, he will ensure that he has statements from all eight.
If any are missing, he will ask for statements to be taken from the rest, and read those.
The other prosecutor said that he relies entirely upon his (para-legal) case worker to
review the material, and will sign the disclosure form unless the worker brings
something to his attention indicating he should not. See interview with Senior and
Subordinate Crown Prosecutors, in Abingdon, U.K. (Apr. 13, 1999). All of my
informants agreed that some prosecutors routinely sign off on disclosure forms
prepared by the police.
In a few locations chief prosecutors have announced a policy of refusing to accept
police schedules that are insufficiently detailed. See interview with Principal Crown
Prosecutor, Casework Services Division, CPS Headquarters, in London, U.K. (Apr.
14, 1999).
183. See infra Appendix A, notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
184. This appears to occur commonly in London, for example, at the hands of
judges who may be ignorant of, or indifferent to, the Act's requirements. See
interview with defense solicitor, in London, U.K. (Apr. 12, 1999).
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material.
D. Conclusion
Despite the controversies surrounding the adoption and
implementation of the 1996 Act, there seems to be general agreement
on three important propositions: first, that in contested cases the
police should be required to record, retain, and reveal to the
prosecutor all of the relevant material gathered in the investigation;
second, that formal processes are needed to structure the
communications between police investigators and the prosecutor,
including a strong prosecutorial role in police training; and third, that
the defense should have access at least to schedules of the non-
sensitive relevant material. Despite the failure of English police in
practice to provide sufficiently detailed and complete schedules and
copies of unused materials in the first instance, the schedules function,
at least in routine, serious,1s contested cases, to alert both the
prosecution and the defense to the existence and location of basic
materials known to the police. It then falls to the defense lawyer, with
the aid of the court if necessary,18 to press the prosecutor to review
the materials or to allow the defense to do so. Thus the English
system establishes a framework to give prosecutors regular access to a
comprehensive record of the police investigation. This is precisely the
sort of access that the U.S. Supreme Court in Kyles assumed was
available to prosecutors in this country.'8
II. LESSONS OF THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES: THE PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DUTY TO SEEK
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE KNOWN TO THE POLICE
Although many features of the English experience should be of
interest to Americans,lts I shall concentrate on two that I find most
185. Although roughly the same police and prosecution responsibilities regarding
exculpatory evidence apply to contested summary and Crown Court proceedings,
important implementation differences exist as between summary prosecutions and
Crown Court proceedings. According to all of my informants, the Act is not generally
followed in cases litigated in the magistrates' court: the police often do not submit
schedules of unused material, and prosecutors are more likely to sign off on police
schedules without pressing the police for more detailed descriptions or reviewing the
listed material to see whether it is disclosable. Also, defendants in magistrates' court
proceedings rarely submit defense statements, and therefore rarely ask the court to
order disclosure under section 8 of the Act. See interview with Crown Prosecutor, in
Coventry, U.K. (Apr. 6, 1999); interview with two defense solicitors, in Birmingham,
U.K. (Apr. 13, 1999 & Apr. 21, 1999 respectively).
186. This can be accomplished informally, or by means of a formal application
under Section 8 of the Act. See CPIA, supra note 32, § 8.
187. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
188. The English have adopted several safeguards that might be worth emulating,
such as the use of independent "identification officers," see infra notes 351-55 and
accompanying text, the requirement that interrogations be recorded, see supra notes
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instructive as they might relate to implementation of the prosecutor's
Brady duties: government regulation of police record-keeping, and
measures ensuring the prosecutor's access to investigative police files.
As to the former, even before enactment of the CPIA in 1996, the
English imposed a set of elaborate record-keeping requirements on
the police. 189 Requirements meant to enhance the objectivity and
reliability of investigative records, such as those governing police
notebooks, the role of PACE custody officers and identification
officers, and policy books, serve to increase the transparency of police
investigation to external review. 9' Other devices, such as the use of
HOLMES to investigate selected major crimes, were designed to
achieve efficient crime detection, but have the same incidental effect.
The 1996 Act gave legislative force to the previously established duty
of police to record and retain relevant investigative material.
Regarding prosecutorial access to police files, PACE, the CPIA,
and the Practice Codes established under both statutes give
prosecutors detailed guidance regarding the specific items that they
must obtain from investigators before trial, and in what form. 191 These
requirements track corresponding police duties to record and reveal
such items to prosecutors.
Thus, the English have established a comprehensive regulatory
framework for police record-keeping and revelation of case
information to the prosecutor. They have also devoted significant
resources to enforcing this regime, including such measures as
promulgation of appropriate forms and schedules, training of police
152-56 and accompanying text, and the Criminal Case Review Commission, see supra
note 70. These reforms resulted from "post-mortem" inquiries, established in
response to notorious miscarriages of justice. See also Fred Kaufman, Commission on
Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin (Queen's Printer for Ontario, Canada, 1998),
available in <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/html/MORIN/morin.htm>
(visited Mar. 2, 2000) (official commission of inquiry into wrongful murder conviction
and incarceration of young man later cleared by DNA evidence). The English
experience also shows that reform commissions can operate as double-edged swords:
an inquiry established in response to public concern over conviction of the factually
innocent may be "captured" by conservatives, producing reforms designed to
facilitate conviction of the factually guilty. Cf Craig M. Bradley, The Failure of the
Criminal Procedure Revoltion: A Response, 47 J. Legal Educ. 129, 133 (1997)
(acknowledging that national codification of criminal procedure regulations in the
United States would risk "letting political considerations unacceptably diminish the
rights of criminal suspects," but still preferring the relative clarity of comprehensive
procedural codes to the confusion and inconsistency of constantly shifting case law).
189. These requirements were imposed under PACE and the Guinness Advice. See
supra notes 51-59, 64-68 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A.
190. While scholars disagree on the effectiveness of the PACE record-keeping
reforms, most agree that they have at least partially achieved their aim. See supra
notes 64-66 and accompanying text. But some argue that the PACE "safeguards"
simply mask and legitimate the exercise of broad police discretion. See Bridges &
Bunyon, supra note 66, at 91-94; McConville et al., supra note 31, at 118-23.
191. See supra notes 69-101 and accompanying text.
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and prosecutors,1' 2 and the designation of particular police personnel
to perform record-keeping duties as custody officers, 93 identification
officers, 194 and disclosure officers. 19
Like England, the United States requires prosecutors to disclose
exculpatory evidence known to the police.'" However, the two
countries take radically different approaches to implementing the
prosecutor's duty. In the United States, the absence of legislative or
other regulation of police record-keeping and transmission of
information to prosecutors is starkly apparent. American legislatures
have traditionally taken a "hands-off" approach to the regulation of
police practices. 97 Furthermore, it appears that Americans have not
committed significant resources to the task of training police to record
and reveal exculpatory evidence to prosecutors. Instead, we have
relied on self-regulation by law enforcement agencies and the efforts
of prosecutors. For reasons discussed elsewhere,"9 I suspect that
neither resort has been, nor promises to be,199 effective in ensuring
192. Initial training of police and prosecutors, for which substantial written
materials were prepared, was carried out before the CPIA was implemented. See
interview with Principal Crown Prosecutor, Casework Services Division, CPS
Headquarters, in London, U.K. (Apr. 14, 1999).
193. See infra Appendix A, notes 339-45 and accompanying text.
194. See infra Appendix A, notes 350-52 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. In the United States this is
constitutionally required by Kyles, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; see also
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 9A Department of Justice Manual, Criminal Div., § 9-90.210, at
9-1943.3 (1997) (discussing prosecutor's duty, under case law, to search for Brady
information in the files of "aligned agencies," defined as agencies "actively involved
in the investigation or the prosecution of a particular case"); Fredman, supra note 5,
at 348 ("[AII information within a particular prosecutor's office falls within the ambit
of Brady."); Hochman, supra note 5, at 1677-79 (discussing prosecutor's duty to
gather exculpatory evidence held by persons outside the prosecutor's office); Lis
Wiehl, Keeping Files on the File Keepers: When Prosecutors are Forced to Turn Over
the Personnel Files of Federal Agents to Defense Lawyers, 72 Wash. L Rev. 73, 75-77
(1997) (discussing duty of prosecutors to search personnel files of federal agents who
will testify for impeachment material).
197. The Warren Court decisions protecting the rights of criminal defendants vis-a-
vis the police and the courts can be seen as filling a vacuum created by legislative
abstention. But see Bradley, supra note 188, at 129-30 (arguing that Congress has
power to, and should, enact a national code of criminal procedure governing the
conduct of all federal and state law enforcement agents). Professor Bradley's
proposal has not been warmly received by scholarly commentators. See id. at 130-31
(citing negative reviews of his proposed reform).
198. See generally Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 26-31 (offering several
justifications for self-regulation).
199. Barring increased external pressures, it is doubtful that police agencies will
have incentive to overhaul their own practices. However, the predictable increased
use of computer-assisted record keeping should at least reduce the cost-disincentives
of more comprehensive recording and transmission of information from police to
prosecutors. See, eg., James W. Stevens, Computer Technology, in The Encyclopedia
of Police Science 73-75 (William G. Bailey ed., 1989) (predicting expanded use of
"direct-field entry reporting systems for completing police reports and for speeding
information transfer into the police communications process"); Seanna Browder,
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regular prosecutorial access to exculpatory evidence known to the
police. Yet, without such access, prosecutors cannot meet their
constitutional obligations to the defendant.
Congress could address this problem by adopting an English-style
legislative remedy, binding on state and local prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies. As compared to reforming the rules of
professional responsibility, legislation would have advantages of
greater uniformity, comprehensiveness, and enforceability. Congress
would have the power to adopt such legislation, based upon its power
to enforce the prosecutor's Due Process duty under Brady.
Alternatively, Congress could use incentives, such as federal funding
for local law enforcement, to encourage the states to adopt such
legislation.2" However, despite the rising number of well-publicized
miscarriages of justice,2"' neither Congress nor state legislatures are
likely to impose English-style record-keeping practices on state and
local law enforcement agencies. As Donald Dripps has persuasively
argued, no sufficiently powerful constituency exists to persuade
legislators to invest scarce political and economic resources in such a
cause.
202
Now, The Cops are Strapping on Computers, Bus. Wk., July 13, 1998, at 7, available in
1998 WL 8133191 (reporting field-testing in three cities of lightweight wearable
computers for use in police investigation; computers are equipped with digital
cameras and laser range finders for recording crime-scene data); Seaskate, Inc., The
Evolution and Development of Police Technology: A Technical Report Prepared for
the National Committee on Criminal Justice Technology 4 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice,
1998), available in <http:www.NLECTC.org> (quoting a police chief as saying, "My
vision is that when an officer comes through the academy, we give him his weapon, we
give him his radio, and we give him his laptop computer").
Presumably, large-scale investigations in the United States, such as the World
Trade Center and Oklahoma Bombing cases, are conducted using computerized
programs similar to the English HOLMES system. See infra Appendix A, notes 356-
66 and accompanying text; see also Seaskate, Inc., supra, at 63 (describing use of
"records management systems" that allow information to be fed into a "relational
database," which can be "manipulated and retrieved based on the criteria of the
detective"). I am not familiar with the extent of such techniques in this country, nor
with the treatment of such databases in criminal discovery.
200. I thank Professor Kevin McMunigal for his contributions to my thinking on
these points.
201. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Chicago Trib., Nov. 14, 16-18, 1999
(five-part series on faulty justice in Illinois capital cases from 1977 to 1999); Ken
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Chicago Trib., Jan. 8-12, 1999 (five-part series on
prosecutorial misconduct and miscarriages of justice in the United States); Alan
Berlow, The Wrong Man, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1999, at 66, 66 (reporting on
"horrifyingly likely" prospect that innocent people will be executed in America); Matt
Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes on Momentum of Its Own, L.A. Times,
Dec. 31, 1999, at Al (describing how over a dozen police officers have been
suspended in scandal involving, inter alia, framing innocent suspects); Bill Moushey,
Win at all Costs: Government Misconduct in the Name of Expedient Justice, Pitt. Post-
Gazette, Nov. 22, 24 & 29, 1997, and Dec. 1, 6, 7, 8 & 13, 1998 (series on abuses by
federal prosecutors).
202. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the
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It is also unlikely that courts will take up the slack. Like the
Supreme Court in Kyles,2 °3 courts generally recognize the prosecutor's
dependence upon law enforcement to comply with Brady.
Accordingly, they have been willing to hold law enforcement officers
liable under the Federal Civil Rights Act for suppressing exculpatory
evidence.' But courts have been reluctant to grant equitable relief
compelling police to investigate, record, and reveal exculpatory
evidence to prosecutors. 5 Also, court rules governing pretrial
discovery reflect judicial reluctance to prescribe police record-keeping
procedures: the rules commonly require prosecutors to disclose
exculpatory evidence,2 6 but stop short of requiring the police to
Accused?, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079, 1089-92 (1993).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 265-72.
205. This was demonstrated in Pahner v. City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067, 1077
(N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985), a class action suit seeking, inter
alia, an order prohibiting the Chicago Police Department from keeping clandestine
"street files" separate from the investigative files that the Department turned over to
the State's Attorney's Office. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 36-38, 42-44
(discussing the case in greater depth). The district court granted the plaintiffs
sweeping relief, ordering the police department to: (1) conduct impartial
investigations, take complete notes, and pursue exculpatory evidence; (2) preserve all
handwritten and other notes as well as other investigative documents in a single file
with a checklist of the contents; (3) respond to subpoenas and discovery motions by
transmitting copies of the checklist to the prosecutor, and (4) train its detectives in the
new procedures. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated almost all of the
lower court's order, including those parts ordering police and prosecutors to
"restructure their internal procedures for the recording, maintaining and production
of investigative files." Palmer, 755 F.2d at 576. According to the circuit court,
Supreme Court precedents (Brady and Younger) defining the government's due
process obligation to gather and preserve potentially exculpatory evidence limited the
courts' power to prescribe more comprehensive prophylactic procedures. See id. at
574-77.
206. Writings about Brady issues have tended to focus on the prosecutor's
constitutional and ethical duties, while paying little attention to her corollary duties
under state discovery rules. Yet, a review of state pretrial discovery rules and statutes
reveals that 43 jurisdictions explicitly require the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory
evidence (variously defined) to the defense before trial. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 16.1(a)
(within fourteen days of defendant's request); Alaska R_ Crim. P. 16 (upon
defendant's motion); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(a) (within ten days from arraignment);
Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1 (upon timely request); Cal. R. Glenn Super. Ct. 12.7 (within 14
days from information); Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1) (within 20 days of first
appearance); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-86a(a) (West 1994) (upon defendant's
motion); Del. R. Com. PI. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A) (upon defendant's request);
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1) (within 15 days of serving notice of discovery); Haw. tR
Penal P. 16(e)(1) (within 10 days from arraignment); Idaho Ct. R. 16(a) (as soon as
practicable); Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(a) (as soon as practical after defendant's motion); Ind.
Marion Super. Ct. Crim. R. 7(1)(a) (20 days from initial hearing); Iowa Code Ann. §
813.2, Rule 13 (West 1999) (pretrial request by defendant); Ky. R. Jefferson Cir. Ct.
603(A) (within 10 days before pretrial conference); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
718 (West 1981) (pretrial); Me. R. Crim. P. 16 (within 10 days from arraignment on
certain offenses); Md. R. Crim. Causes 4-263(b) (defendant's request); Mass. R. Crim.
P. 14(a)(1) (pretrial motion); Mich. Ct. R. 6.201(F) (within seven days of defendant's
request); Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01 (at defendant's request before omnibus hearing); Mo.
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record such evidence and reveal it to the prosecutor. This is true even
of very expansive disclosure schemes, such as the one recently
adopted in local rules by the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.2 °
The Massachusetts rules impose far-reaching, detailed duties on
prosecutors to disclose potentially exculpatory information to the
defense.2°8  Reflecting the Kyles holding that prosecutors are
responsible for disclosing Brady material known to law enforcement
agents "acting on the government's behalf in the case,"0 9 the Local
Rules require the prosecutor to inform "all... law enforcement
agencies formally participating in the criminal investigation.., of the
discovery obligations set forth [in the Rules] and obtain any
information subject to disclosure from each such agency. ' '
Although the Rules expressly require criminal investigators to
preserve relevant materials and documents made or possessed by
R. Crim. P. 25.03(B) (written request by defendant); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-322(1)
(1998) (defendant's request); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1912 (1995) (same); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 174.235(1) (1997) (same); N.H. Super. Ct. R. 98 (within 30 days from a not-guilty
plea); N.M. R. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 5-501(A) (within ten days from arraignment);
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 240.20(1) (McKinney 1993) (upon defendant's demand); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a) (1973) (defendant's motion); N.D. R. Crim. P. 16
(defendant's written request); Ohio R. Crim. P. 16(A) (defendant's request); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2002(A)(1) (West 1994) (same); Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.815 (1990)
(same); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(A) (same); R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (same); S.C. R.
Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A) (same); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-13-1 (Michie 1978)
(defendant's written request); Tex. Crim. P. Code Ann. § 39.14(a) (West 2000)
(defendant's motion showing good cause); Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a) (upon request, but
as soon as practical following the filing of charges and before the defendant is
required to plead); Vt. R. Crim. P. 16(1) (as soon as possible, after a plea of not
guilty); Wash. St. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 4.7(1) (no later than the omnibus hearing); W.
Va. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (defendant's request); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.23(1) (West 1998)
(within a reasonable time before trial).
207. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.1-116.9 (adopted Sept. 8,
1998, effective Dec. 1, 1998); Report of the Judicial Members of the Committee
Established to Review and Recommend Revisions of the Local Rules of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts Concerning Criminal Cases
(1998) [hereinafter Mass. Rules Committee Report]. The full texts of the adopted
rules and the report are accessible at <http://www.bostonbar.org/dd/crimrules/report.
htm> (last visited Mar. 3, 2000). See Will Revolutionary Discovery Shot be Heard
'Round the World?, 12 BNA Crim. Prac. Rep. 483, 43-44 (1998); infra text
accompanying notes 208-213.
208. Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not address the
prosecutor's Brady duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant before
trial, some federal district courts outside of Massachusetts also regulate such
disclosure in local rules. See, e.g., D.N.H. Local R. 16.1(c); D.N.M. Local Crim. R.
16.1; N.D.N.Y. R. 16.1(c); E.D.N.C. Local R. Prac. P. 43.01; D. Vt. Local R. P. 16.1(a);
N.D. W. Va. Local R. 4.08.
209. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995).
210. D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.8. Rule 116.1(A)(1) subjects
to automatic discovery "all discoverable material and information in the possession,
custody, or control of the government ... the existence of which is known, or by the
exercise of due diligence may become known, to the [prosecutor] . . . ." Id.
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them2 11 they do not expressly require them to assist prosecutors in
implementing Brady by recording212 or revealing these items to the
prosecutor. This failure, which is typical of court rules and standards,
should probably be understood as expressing judicial reluctance to
intrude on the executive domain, rather than a doubt that courts have
power to impose such duties on the police.1 3
Whether viewed as regrettable default or principled abstention, the
consequence of judicial (combined with legislative) inaction is plain:
prosecutors have the sole responsibility for obtaining access to Brady
material held by law enforcement agents. In light of the severe
practical limits on a prosecutor's ability to control law enforcement
agencies, this might be viewed as unrealistic. On the other hand, as an
executive agent sharing crime control goals and responsibilities with
211. Local Rule 116.9(A) provides:
All contemporaneous notes, memoranda, statements, reports, surveillance
logs, tape recordings, and other documents memorializing matters relevant
to the charges contained in the indictment made by or in the custody of any
law enforcement officer whose agency at the time was formally participating
in an investigation intended, in whole or in part, to result in a federal
indictment shall be preserved until the entry of judgment unless otherwise
ordered by Court.
Id. Rule 116.9(A). The Rule does not require the preservation of rough drafts of
reports after a subsequent draft of a final report is prepared; however, the rough
contemporaneous notes upon which the drafts were based must be retained. See id.
Rule 116.9(A)-(B).
212. The Rules indirectly require that some information known to non-prosecutor
government officials be recorded in tangible form. For example, the government
must produce "a statement" whether promises of rewards or inducement have been
given to government witnesses, see id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(c), and a "witten
description" of criminal cases pending against government witnesses, see id. Rule
116.2(B)(1)(e), and of the failure of percipient witnesses to make a positive
identification of the defendant in an identification procedure, see iW. Rule
116.2(B)(1)(f). In addition, other rules, which require production of "exculpatory
information," probably intend that disclosure take documentary form. This would
implicitly require either the investigators or the prosecutor to reduce to writing
otherwise non-recorded exculpatory information that must be disclosed, such as
information that "tends to cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any witness,"
iL Rule 116.2(B)(2)(a), or inconsistent oral statements. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(b).
213. Courts have power to compel production of evidence by persons who are not
parties, their attorneys, or witnesses in the case. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (allowing courts to issue orders and injunctions binding
"parties,... their.., agents.... employees ... and ... those persons in active concert
or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order"). Courts are also
willing to order police to preserve relevant evidence in their possession. See D. Mass.
Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.9(A); see also Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755
F.2d 560, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding district court order to police to preserve
"street files" for the plaintiff sub-class composed of convicted felons); United States v.
Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ordering preservation of "all tape
recordings or handwritten or typed notes of interviews or communications made in
connection with this case" by all state and federal law enforcement personnel).
Although an order to preserve existing evidence is less intrusive and less costly to
implement than one requiring affirmative actions, such as recording or transmitting
evidence, the difference seems to be one of degree rather than one of kind.
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law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor is better positioned to elicit
their cooperation than either defense counsel or the court. If, because
of legislative abstention, prosecutors' efforts prove unavailing, they
are better situated than any other constituency to lobby the legislature
to intervene.214
What steps might be taken to bring prosecutorial practice into line
with the Supreme Court's expectations announced in Kyles? The
foregoing account of the English system suggests changes in our
ethical rules and standards to address this situation.
A. The Place of Ethical Norms in Regulating the Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
The American prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is
expressed in a tangled web of regulation, consisting of overlapping
layers of constitutional and sub-constitutional norms.1 5 The former
are essentially defined by Brady's due process jurisprudence, which
aspires to national uniformity.2 16 The latter, which vary by state and,
sometimes, by county or district within the same state, are embodied
in rules of pretrial discovery and professional responsibility. The
ethical norms include not only disciplinary rules, but also-in
standards and commentaries-expressions of general principles and
guides to particular best practices.1 7
The disclosure requirements imposed by these various sources can
differ in scope and timing. For example, a prosecutor's failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence in a particular case might satisfy her
obligations under the Due Process Clause, yet violate her duty under
broader ethics provisions and discovery rules.218  The difference
214. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev.
223, 281-82 (1993) (discussing political influence of prosecutor organizations).
215. See, e.g, Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 72 (1995)
(describing how federal prosecutors are bound by federal rules and statutes, the Due
Process Clause, codes of professional responsibility, rules promulgated on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis, and internal guidelines adopted by the Department of Justice).
216. Disclosure duties in some states are also governed by more protective state
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, State Constitutionalization
of Criminal Procedure and the Prosecutor's Disclosure Obligations, 18 Westchester
B.J. 101, 107-09 (1991) (describing the New York Court of Appeals's reliance on a
more protective state constitution).
217. See generally Zacharias, supra note 214 (discussing the modern trend of
specificity in the regulation of lawyers).
218. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that Brady "requires
less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which call
generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate or
mitigate"); McMunigal, supra note 22, at 1025 n.206 (noting that Model Code DR 7-
103(B) and Model Rule 3.8(d) are "more expansive than the original formulation of
the Brady rule, since neither contains a 'materiality' limitation or a requirement that
the material be requested by the defense").
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derives from the fact that Brady serves a limited purpose of
guaranteeing a fair trial, and so requires disclosure only of "material"
evidence, defined in terms of its likely effect on the trial outcome.219
However, under ethics provisions and rules of pretrial discovery in
some jurisdictions, even non-material evidence must be disclosed if it
"tends to negate [defendant's] guilt" or "mitigate the degree of the
offense."'  Also, pretrial discovery rules might require earlier, and
broader, disclosure of exculpatory evidence than either
constitutional221 or ethical norms require. Whereas the latter two sets
219. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (defining "material"
evidence retrospectively as existing "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different"). This outcome-determinative standard, drawn from Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is especially difficult to apply before trial, when the
prosecutor will not know what evidence will be presented. For a careful discussion of
this aspect of Bagley, see McMunigal, supra note 22, at 1008-11. At least one federal
district court has proposed a broader prospective test of "materiality." See infra note
298 and accompanying text.
220. This language comes from the Model Code's DR 7-103(B) and EC 7-13. See
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(B), EC 7-13 (1983). Later
ABA codes and standards contain similar language. See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.8(d) (1998); Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice Standard 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1992) (reproduced infra Appendix B); Standards
for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard ll-2.1(a)(iii) (3d ed.
1996). For an analysis of the evolving language used in the successive ABA ethical
rules to define the prosecutor's disclosure duty, and of the general ethical prohibitions
that might apply to suppression of exculpatory evidence, see Richard A. Rosen,
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. Rev. 693, 709-14 (1987); see also Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 833, 879-82 (1997) (tracing the history
of the ABA professional responsibility rules on exculpatory evidence to Canon 5 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics originally adopted in 1908).
Pretrial discovery rules in 17 states also incorporate the "tends to negate" standard.
See Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(b)(3); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(a)(7); Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1(d);
Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(i); Haw. R. Penal P.
16(b)(1)(vii); Idaho Crim. R. 16(a); Ii. S. Ct. R. 412(c); Ind. Marion Super. Ct. Rule
7(2)(b); Ky. R. Jefferson Cir. Ct. 603(0; Md. Rule 4-263(a)(1); Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01;
Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.03(A)(9); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-322(1)(e) (1999); Utah R.
Crim. P. 16(a)(4); Vt. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(2); Wash. St. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 4.7(a)(3).
221. See supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text. In United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected the claim that Brady created a broad
constitutional right to pretrial discovery. See id. at 675 n.7. Rather, the Court
regarded Brady as a "trial right," satisfied so long as disclosure is made in time for
effective defense use at that stage. See id. at 678. Accordingly, most courts have been
reluctant to enforce Brady's constitutional mandate as part of pretrial discovery. See
Charles H. Whitebread & Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure 598 (1993);
Wayne. R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.5(e) (1985). The
timing of Brady disclosure is especially problematic when Brady material is protected
from early disclosure by the Jencks Act. Compare United States v. Beckford, 962 F.
Supp. 780, 791-94 (E.D. Va. 1997) (discussing split in federal circuits, and choosing
case-by-case balancing test over competing tests under which either Brady or Jencks
trumps the other), ivith United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1285-86 (6th Cir.
1988) (finding mid-trial disclosure adequate to protect defendant's Brad, right). But
see United States v. Snell, 899 F. Supp. 17,21 n.9 (D. Mass. 1995) (criticizing Presser).
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of norms protect interests in a fair and accurate process, discovery
rules serve the courts' additional interest in efficient case processing
and the avoidance of delay.
Given the complexity resulting from multiple, conflicting sources of
law, ethical rules should accurately inform prosecutors of their
disclosure duties. In light of Kyles, however, the relevant ABA rules
and standards express these duties in misleadingly narrow language.
They fail to inform prosecutors of their duty to learn of and disclose
exculpatory evidence known to law enforcement agents. Also, they
offer no guidance as to the appropriate steps prosecutors might take
to comply with that duty.
B. Recognizing an Ethical Duty to Learn of Exculpatory Evidence
Known to the Police
The Supreme Court held in Kyles that prosecutors have a
constitutional duty to disclose not only "material" exculpatory
evidence known to them, but also evidence known to "others acting
on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. '2 2 In
addition, as Kyles recognized, the latter duty necessarily implies a
third duty: to learn of "any favorable evidence known to... the
police."'  Of these three duties, only the first is currently expressed
as an ethical duty. ABA Model Rule 3.8(d), the sole disciplinary rule
addressed to the Brady obligation, simply requires disclosure of
exculpatory evidence or information "known to the prosecutor. 22 1
The ABA Standards for the Prosecution Function state a similarly
narrow approach by forbidding only "intentional" failure to
disclose.2" Thus, neither the Model Rule nor the Standard alerts
prosecutors to their additional obligations to learn of and disclose
The conception of Brady as a trial right has led to disagreement about whether
Brady material must be disclosed prior to the entry of a guilty plea. See Erica G.
Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A Debate
on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 567, 573 & n.43 (1999) (noting
that most, but not all, lower courts require disclosure of Brady material before entry
of plea and citing cases); McMunigal, supra note 22, at 958, 1019 (arguing that Brady's
"due process" requirement also applies in pre- and post-trial stages).
222. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
223. Id.
224. Rule 3.8 states in relevant part that:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to
the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility
by a protective order of the tribunal ....
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8.
225. Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.11
(reproduced infra Appendix B).
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exculpatory evidence known to other members of the prosecution
team, including law enforcement agents. One must look to the ABA
Discovery Standards for an expression of the prosecutor's duty to
disclose material possessed by investigators, -6  and to make
"reasonable efforts" to ensure that investigators provide relevant
material and information to prosecutors.' But the Discovery
Standards do not purport to define the prosecutor's ethical
responsibilities, and have no impact except in jurisdictions that have
modeled their discovery rules after them. 8  Even in those
jurisdictions, prosecutors are likely to look for ethical training and
guidance to the Rules and Standards directly addressing prosecutorial
ethics, rather than to the Discovery Standards.
The ABA should consider amending Model Rule 3.8, and
Prosecution Function Standards 3-2.7 and 3-3.11, to specify the
prosecutor's ethical obligation to learn of exculpatory evidence known
to law enforcement investigators. The Rules should also guide
226. See Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-
4.3(a) (3d ed. 1996). Drawn from former ABA Discovery Standard 11-2.1(d) (2d ed.
1980), Standard 11-4.3(a) extends the disclosure obligations of both prosecutors and
defense attorneys to "material and information in the possession or control of
members of the attorney's staff and of any others who either regularly report to or,
with reference to the particular case, have reported to the attorney's office." Id. In
conjunction with Discovery Standard 11-2.1(a)(viii), it applies to exculpatory evidence
within the prosecutor's possession or control. See id.
227. ABA Discovery Standard 11-4.3, entitled "Obligation to obtain discoverable
material," states: "(b) The prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to ensure that
material and information relevant to the defendant and the offense charged is
provided by investigative personnel to the prosecutor's office." Id. Standard 11-4.3(b).
Standard 11-43(b) replaced former Discovery Standard 11-2.2(c) (1986), which
required prosecutors to "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the
various investigative personnel and the prosecutor's office sufficient to place within
the prosecutor's possession or control all material and information relevant to the
accused and the offense charged."
228. Several states have adopted the language of Standard 11-4.3(a) in discovery
rules. See, e.g., Alaska R. Crim. P. 16 (any others who have participated in the
investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with
reference to the particular case have reported to the prosecuting attorney's office);
Colo. R. Crim. P. Rule 16(a)(3) (same); Idaho Crim. R. 16(a) (same); Md. Rule 4-
262(c) (same); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-322(4) (1999) (any others who have
participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case). Some state court rules
word the requirement slightly differently. See, e.g., Ariz. R Crim. P. 15.1(d) (material
and information in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor's staff and
of any other persons who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the
case and who are under the prosecutor's control). Other states use more general
language. See, e.g., Ind. Marion Super. Ct. R. 7(2)(a) ("The State shall disclose the
following material and information within its possession or control .... "). Virginia
expressly limits the obligation to certain information known by the prosecutor to be
"within the possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth." Va. R. Sup. Ct.
3A:11(b)(2); see also Ky. R. Jefferson Cir. Ct. 603(B) (similar).
A few states have incorporated the language of former Standard 11-2.2(c) into their
court rules. See, e.g., Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(4); Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(0; see also Ark. R.




prosecutors on how to implement this responsibility.229 This could be
done by specifying in greater detail the prosecutor's duty to
familiarize herself with existing police record-keeping practices, to
promote uniform record-keeping and reporting by investigative
agencies within her jurisdiction, and to train police in the importance
of recording specific types of potentially exculpatory evidence, and
revealing it to her office. These changes could be accomplished by
adding the following sub-paragraphs to Model Rule 3.8, and to
Prosecution Function Standards 3-2.7 and 3-3.11:11
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
[Proposed] (c-1) make reasonable efforts to ensure that investigators,
law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case reveal to the
prosecutor's office all material and information that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense or sentence.
STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION
3-2.7. Relations with Police.
[Proposed] (c) A prosecutor should become familiar with existing
law enforcement record-keeping practices in the prosecutor's
jurisdiction.
[Proposed] (d) The prosecutor should encourage and assist law
enforcement agencies to adopt a uniform police report that will
contain all information necessary for a successfid prosecution and for
compliance with the prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable
information to the defense.
3-3.11. Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor
[Proposed] (a-1) A prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to
ensure that all material and information which tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the accused is provided by
investigative personnel to the prosecutor's office.
229. On the need to provide "affirmative ethical guidance" to prosecutors, in
addition to prohibiting misconduct, see Little, supra note 19, at 742-44.
230. For the full text of these provisions see infra Appendix B.
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C. Discussion
1. Justification for the Proposed Amendments
The proposed amendments address the prosecutor's duty to bridge
the gap between what she knows and what she must know in order to
comply with Kyles. The collective impact of several factors makes it
important to express this duty as an ethical responsibility. These
factors include: (1) the de facto monopoly enjoyed by police and
prosecutors over early access to the raw "facts" of the case, including
potentially exculpatory facts, and the corresponding disadvantage to
the defense; (2) the absence of strong incentives for police to record
and reveal exculpatory evidence to prosecutors,2' or for prosecutors
to ensure that they do so;22 (3) the risk that government failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence will lead to conviction of the
innocent- 3 and (4) the prosecutor's heightened "ministerial" duty to
ensure disclosure, arising from the absence of effective adversary
safeguards that might otherxvise allow her to rely upon defense
counsel to achieve this goal.' Regardless of how any particular
231. Kevin McMunigal has described the conflicting incentives affecting police
decisions to conceal or reveal exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor. See McMunigal,
supra note 22, at 1003-04. He points out that although a rule mandating prosecutorial
disclosure to the defense creates disincentives for police revelation to the prosecutor,
counter-incentives favoring revelation exist. These counter-incentives include the
desire of police to avoid convicting the wrong person, their interest in alerting the
prosecutor to evidence of which the defense might learn independently, and the risk
and consequences of later detection of police concealment. See id. However, there is
reason to doubt the influence of these "counter-incentives" during the routine
processes of police investigation and interviewing, when police decide what
information to gather, record, and retain. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at
8-9 (arguing that pressures to conserve scarce resources, protect themselves from
embarrassment and civil liability, and ensure conviction of presumptively guilty
suspects lead police to ignore or suppress exculpatory evidence); supra notes 137-142
and accompanying text (stating reasons why police fail to gather and preserve
exculpatory facts).
232. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 51-52; Bennett L Gershman, The
New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 443-45 (1992) [hereinafter Gershman, New
Prosecutors] (noting the "failure of professional disciplinary organizations to deal
with [prosecutorial] misconduct"); Rosen, supra note 220, at 697 (observing that
disciplinary sanctions for violating Brady are rarely sought or imposed on
prosecutors).
233. See Gershman, New Prosecutors, supra note 232, at 451-53 (citing convictions
of innocent persons in cases involving prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory
evidence); supra note 201.
234. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own. Updating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L Rev. 923, 971
(1996) (citing prosecutor's "ministerial" role during the investigative stage, in which
prosecutors should "[a]ctively seek all evidence, whether the evidence is favorable or
unfavorable to any specific individual"); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the
Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 Am. J. Crim. L 197,220-27 (1988)
(arguing that absence of adversary safeguards triggers heightened duty of
prosecutorial "neutrality").
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jurisdiction defines the prosecutor's duty to disclose information to
the defense, the prosecutor's need to become aware of all potentially
exculpatory evidence known to law enforcement agents remains
constant.
The proposed amendments to Model Rule 3.8 and Prosecution
Standard 3-3.11 articulate the prosecutor's ethical duty. Proposed
Rule 3.8(c-1), requiring prosecutors to make "reasonable efforts" to
acquire exculpatory materials from the police, would expose
prosecutors to disciplinary sanctions for failing to heed the Rule.
Although the prospect of disciplinary enforcement is remote,z" the
proposed amendment would likely affect prosecutorial behavior in
other ways. As Roberta Flowers has written, the greatest benefit of
more specific ethics regulations "is not in their enforceability by
disciplinary bodies, but in their impact on a prosecutor's self
reflection." 6
The language proposed in Rule 3.8(c-1) and Standard 3-3.11(a-1)
partially revives a notion expressed in the 1981 Proposed Final Draft
of the Prosecution Standards. Draft Rule 3.8(d) would have obligated
the prosecutor to "make reasonable efforts to seek all evidence,
whether or not favorable to the defendant." 7 Because that proposal
did not limit the prosecutor's search obligation to materials known to
the police, it was objected to because requiring the prosecutor "to
conduct an investigation for and on behalf of the defendant," was
viewed as unsupported by case authority and unenforceable.23 Not
surprisingly, the proposal was abandoned in the final version of the
Rule. The proposed amendment is more modest, insofar as it extends
the prosecutor's search duty only to material and information known
to the police. 9  In this respect, it evokes the English practice of
ensuring prosecutorial access to both the "used" and "unused"
materials. 40 It also uses the broader term "material," rather than
"evidence," to encompass tangible items that may or may not be
235. See Gershman, New Prosecutors, supra note 232, at 444-45; Rosen, supra note
220, at 697.
236. Flowers, supra note 234, at 964; see also id. at 964 n.322 (discussing the benefit
of professional codes "in narrowing attorneys' capacity for self-delusion about the
propriety of a given action" (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 709 (1981)));
Zacharias, supra note 214, at 227-37 (explaining that codes serve purposes in addition
to defining punishable conduct).
237. Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and
Standards 248 (1997) (quoting 1981 draft of the rule).
238. Summary of comments on Rule 3.8 received by Kutak Commission, prepared
for meeting on April 16-17 (Mar. 12, 1982) (sent to the author by Peter Geraghty,
Director, ETHICSearch, ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility) (unpublished,
on file with author).
239. This limitation is implied by the amendment. It could be made explicit by
inserting after "all material and information" the words "known to them or in their
possession."
240. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
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admissible in evidence.24'
The proposed language obliges the prosecutor to seek from
investigators only those materials that favor the defense. In view of
the unsatisfactory English experience of relying on the police to
screen for exculpatory evidence,21 an argument exists for amending
both Rule 3.8 and Standard 3-3.11 in broader terms. These "broader
terms" would require the prosecutor to seek from the police all
"material and information relevant to the defendant and the offense
charged,"'243 as well as screening the material personally for disclosable
items. In many routine proceedings, this would be entirely feasible.
However, in cases involving voluminous materials, the prosecutor
might be forced to rely on law enforcement agents to select the
disclosable information. For this reason, the proposed language
narrowly defines the materials that the prosecutor should seek to
obtain. But the Commentary should inform prosecutors that it is
desirable, when feasible, to review all relevant materials in law
enforcement possession.
2. Relation to Other Rules and Standards
Proposed Model Rule 3.8(c-1) is modeled upon Rule 3.8(e), which
requires prosecutors to "exercise reasonable care to prevent
investigators, law enforcement personnel [and other persons] ...
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extra
judicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from
making under Rule 3.6.''l Both provisions essentially require the
prosecutor to "police the police," a duty related in turn to Rule 8.4(a),
which holds a lawyer responsible for violations of the Rules though
the acts of another.245 When prosecutors refrain from vigorously
seeking potentially disclosable evidence known to law enforcement
241. See Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-
2.1(a)(viii), 11-4.3(b) (3d ed. 1996) (employing the terms "information" and
"material").
242. See supra Part I.A.
243. See Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-
4.3(b); see also Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard
3-3.11 cmt. (3d ed. 1992) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to acquire all the relevant
evidence without regard to its impact on the success of the prosecution." (emphasis
added)); Flowers, supra note 234, at 971 (citing prosecutor's "ministerial" role during
the investigative stage, in which prosecutors should "[a]ctively seek all evidence,
whether the evidence is favorable or unfavorable to any specific individual").
244. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (1999) (reproduced infra,
Appendix B).
245. See Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of Lawyering 699
(1998); see also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.3 (describing a lawyer's
responsibility for conduct of non-lawyers "employed or retained by or associated with
a lawyer"). This provision does not make prosecutors responsible for the conduct of
police investigators when, as is customary, the police operate independently of the
prosecutor's office.
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agents, they risk violating the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 8.4(a).
The proposed amendment to ABA Standard 3-3.11 goes beyond
the existing text of that Standard in two ways. Unlike sub-paragraph
3.11(b), which enjoins the prosecutor to "make a reasonably diligent
effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request, '246 the duty
described in proposed sub-paragraph 3.11(a-1) neither depends upon
a request from the defense, nor itself imposes any duty to disclose.
Also, because the proposed amendment would create an affirmative
duty to seek all exculpatory evidence known to law enforcement
investigators, it differs from existing sub-paragraph 3.11(c), which
merely forbids intentionally avoiding "pursuit of [exculpatory]
evidence. .247
The proposed amendments to Standard 3-2.7 would inform
prosecutors of steps they should take to obtain all exculpatory
material in police possession. In order to fulfill this obligation
prosecutors must be well informed about the mechanics of police
investigation and record keeping in both routine and specialized
police investigation. In most jurisdictions, a number of relatively
autonomous investigative agencies operate at different levels of local,
state, and federal government.2' These agencies are subject to
various internal regulations affecting record-keeping, but the contents
of departmental regulations are sometimes closely guarded? 49 Also,
246. See Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-
3.11(b).
247. See id. Standard 3-3.11.
248. See Yale Kamisar et al., Modem Criminal Procedure 9-10 (9th ed. 1999)
(describing "fragmentation" of enforcement agencies, especially at the state level).
But see Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 815, 843 (1999) (mentioning influence of the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) in
articulating professional standards and "stimulating needed administrative reforms in
police departments across the country").
249. For example, in the city where I practiced as a public defender in 1989-90,
police department regulations were treated as confidential, rather than public,
documents.
State and local police agencies can probably restrict access to their internal
regulations more easily than can federal investigative agencies, such as the FBI or
DEA, which operate as branches of large bureaucracies. See Kamisar et al., supra
note 248, at 9. I have found no literature on the subject of record keeping
requirements of federal law enforcement agencies. Their official manuals of
investigation are not generally available to the public. Perhaps as a result of requests
made under the Freedom of Information Act, however, photocopied portions of
unpublished manuals are available upon request. For example, the FBI Manual of
Investigative Operations and Guidelines, 1927-78 (formerly called the "FBI Manuals
of Instruction, Investigative Procedures and Guidelines, 1927-1978"), is available
from the FBI on microfiche. Also, a table of contents of the 1986 edition is available,
and members of the public may order photocopies of particular sections. Portions of
the DEA Agents Manual became available to the defense bar in 1999, apparently for
the first time, as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request. See NACDL
Makes DEA Agents' Manual Available-Well, Most of It, 13 Crim. Practice Rep.
(BNA), no. 3, at 44 (1999).
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the investigative practices of American law enforcement agencies
have not been widely studied.' In such environments, American
prosecutors-particularly at the state level-may face a difficult
challenge simply to discover what investigative records are regularly
kept, by whom, and where?51 This undoubtedly poses an obstacle toimplementation of the prosecutor's disclosure obligations. Proposed
Standard 3-2.7(c) directs the prosecutor to become familiar with
existing police record-keeping practices in her jurisdiction. This
requirement reflects the view that a prosecutor's ability to carry out
her duty to learn what potentially exculpatory evidence exists in any
case depends initially on her understanding of those practices. Such
an understanding is also crucial to the prosecutor's obligation,
expressed in the proposed paragraph 3-2.7(d), to promote adoption of
satisfactory uniform reports of criminal investigations.
The advantages of uniform police report forms are obvious.-1 In its
1973 report on the Courts, the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals ("NAC") recommended that
prosecutors "should develop for the use of the police a basic police
report form that includes all relevant information about the offense
and the offender necessary for charging, plea negotiations, and
250. Although some studies have been done in the United States, see, e.g., Fisher,
Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 18-21 & n.93 (describing various approaches taken in
the study of police investigative practices), we know relatively little about police
investigative procedures and record-keeping in this country. Thus, it was possible for
a scholar to declare in 1975: "Regrettably, empirical studies of detectives are
nowhere to be found. As with most of the specialized units, hypotheses about
decision-making are made... , but with very little evidence in the literature as
foundation." William B. Sanders, Detective Work 6 (1977) (quoting Harold Pepinsky,
Police Decision-making, in Decision-making in the Criminal Justice System, at 27
(Don M. Gottfredson ed., Rockville, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health 1975)).
By way of contrast, British scholars have conducted an impressive number of
empirical studies on police investigative procedures in England, many of which are
cited in this Article. See, e.g., John Baldwin & Timothy Moloney, Supervision of
Police Investigations in Serious Criminal Cases (Royal Comm'n on Crim. Justice,
Research Study No. 4,1992); John Baldwin, Preparing the Record of Taped Interview
(Royal Comm'n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 2, 1992); John Baldwin, The
Role of Legal Representatives at the Police Station (Royal Comm'n on Crim. Justice,
Research Study No. 3, 1992); Barrie Irving & Ian McKenzie, A Brief Review of
Relevant Police Training (Royal Comm'n on Crim. Justice, Research Study No. 21,
1993); Irving & Dunnighan, supra note 109; Michael Levi, The Investigation,
Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud (Royal Comm'n on Crim. Justice, Research
Study No. 14,1993); Maguire & Norris, supra note 108.
251. See, eg., Palmer v. City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. 1Il. 1983),
order rev'd by, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that Chicago prosecutors may
have been unaware of the city-wide system of "double" police files); People v. Young,
591 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 & n. (1992) (telling how New York City prosecutors discovered
a Police Department practice of generating intra-departmental "unofficial"
"confidential" reports that were not disclosed to prosecutors).
252. For a discussion of the functions and content of typical police incident reports,
see Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 4-6.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
trial." 3 In making this recommendation, the commission stated:
The police report form is the single most important document in the
prosecutor's case file. Prosecutors... rely on the police report to
identify necessary witnesses, to familiarize themselves with the facts
of the case, and to identify the problems that may arrive at trial.
Since the police report form is the basic prosecutive document, it
should be designed by the prosecutor to meet his requirements and
not by the police based on their interpretation of the prosecutor's
requirements.
254
The National District Attorneys Association ("NDAA"), in
Commentary to its National Prosecution Standards, also urged
prosecutors to develop uniform police reports? 5 According to the
NDAA, a proper report form "insures that all information necessary
for a successful prosecution is available for each case." 6 The NDAA
Commentary also supports discretionary disclosure of "merely
potentially useful material" to the defense, a position which logically
presupposes prosecutorial access to such material in police hands. 25
Reflecting these recommendations, proposed paragraph 2.7(d)
expressly states that uniform police reports should contain potentially
exculpatory information.258
The commentary to proposed Standard 3-2.7 should address and
elaborate upon the connection between the prosecutor's duties under
Kyles, and her obligations under sub-paragraphs 2.7(a) and (b) to
assist in advising and training the police. First, the commentary
should advise prosecutors to promote police training in the
importance of recording, preserving, and revealing potentially
exculpatory evidence to prosecutors. Second, it should stress the
253. Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Crim. Justice Standards and Goals, Courts 247
(1973) [hereinafter Nat'l Advisory Comm'n, Courts]. The Commission's
recommendation was not reflected in its standards for the police. See Nat'l Advisory
Comm'n on Crim. Justice Standards and Goals, Police 570-73 (1973) [hereinafter
Nat'l Advisory Comm'n, Police].
254. Nat'l Advisory Comm'n, Courts, supra note 253, at 248. The Commission's
Report added: "A well-designed report form should require police officers to detail
all of the evidence which supports each element of the offense, the relevant
surrounding circumstances, and all known witnesses and their addresses." Id.
255. See Nat'l District Attorneys Ass'n, National Prosecution Standards Standard
22.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter NDAA Standards].
256. Id. ("The prosecutor has the expertise to design a form that will fit both the
needs of prosecution and those of local law enforcement.").
257. See id. Standard 53.1-53.5 cmt. (stating that prosecutors should consider the
rule of Arizona v. Youngblood as "the minimum standard and not a reason for denial
of discretionary... disclosure that aids the administration of justice;" the prosecutor
should set an office standard that goes beyond the rule in Youngblood and make it
known that the office expects the same for law enforcement agencies.)
258. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text; cf. Standards for Criminal
Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11-4.4(c) (3d ed. 1996) (requiring
prosecutors to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that material and information
relevant to the defendant and the offense charged is provided by investigative
personnel to the prosecutor's office").
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importance of persuading the police to adopt reporting forms that
would include specific categories of potentially exculpatory
evidence.1 9 In these ways, the commentary would reinforce the duties
in Model Rule 3.8 and Prosecution Standard 3-3.11, as amended.
Also, Model Rule 3.8, Standard 3-3.11, and Standard 3-2.7 should
cross-refer to each other.
3. Training Police in the Importance of Revealing Potentially
Exculpatory Evidence to Prosecutors
Prosecutors' access to exculpatory evidence known to the police
depends ultimately on the willingness of police to record, preserve,
and reveal such evidence. Despite pressures inclining police against
such practices,' they also have an interest in cooperating with
prosecutors to implement Brady. As Professor Kevin McMunigal has
pointed out, police have an interest, especially in the early stages of
investigation, in exonerating innocent suspects in order to refocus
their efforts on finding the guilty. 1 Training should stress the risk
that suppression of exculpatory evidence will lead to conviction of the
innocent. More particularly, it should-as in England-stress the
potentially exonerative value of "negative information" and "first
descriptions" from wvitnesses. 2 Like much potentially exculpatory
evidence, such information is "casually acquired" by the police as a
by-product of the search for incriminating evidence.-1 If police
reports specifically required inclusion of such information,
prosecutors would be better able to comply wvith Kyles. The growing
ease of electronic recording and transmission of investigative data
should reduce the costs to police of expanding reporting requirements
in this way.'
As part of their mission to offer the police legal advice and training,
prosecutors should also educate the police in their increasing
vulnerability to suit, both as individuals and agencies, under the
federal Civil Rights Act.' Such knowledge should give police a
powerful reason to cooperate with prosecution efforts to establish a
regular flow of potentially exculpatory evidence from investigators to
the prosecutor's office. Although police have no constitutional duty
259. See infra notes 289-317 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 121-58 and accompanying text.
263. See McMunigal, supra note 22, at 1000 (citing Professor Kronman's distinction
between "casually" and "deliberately" acquired information, in Anthony Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2
(1978)).
264. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Other possible sanctions include reversal of a
guilty defendant's conviction, criminal liability, and internal discipline.
266. See Slobogin, supra note 149, at 392-400 (describing how entity liability of
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to gather exculpatory evidence,267 and only a qualified duty to preserve
such evidence once it comes into their possession,263 they are
constitutionally required to reveal Brady material to the prosecutor. 26 9
Unlike prosecutors, who are absolutely immune from civil liability for
violating a defendant's Brady rights,271 police officers have only a
defense of "qualified immunity" for their actions.27' Therefore, an
officer is liable if a reasonable official would have known that his
police departments promotes systemic deterrence, achieved through training and
internal discipline).
267. Once police have established probable cause, they have no constitutional duty
to investigate further. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (holding
that after valid arrest, police have no duty to investigate arrestee's claims of
innocence); White v. Tamlyn, 961 F. Supp. 1047, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (finding no
duty to seek test of arrestee's blood for cocaine). The White court found no case
"which holds that the due process clause is violated when the police fail to gather
potentially exculpatory evidence." White, 961 F. Supp. at 1062 (quoting Miller v.
Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1989)). The White court also characterized the
holding in Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d at 1119, that "a bad faith failure to collect
potentially exculpatory evidence would violate the due process clause," as "an
aberration and the law only in the Ninth Circuit." White, 961 F. Supp. at 1062 n.12.
268. The due process clause does not impose "an undifferentiated and absolute
duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary
significance in a particular prosecution." Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58
(1988). Under Youngblood and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the
state's duty to preserve exculpatory evidence applies only to "material" evidence, i.e.,
"evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense."
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488. Relief depends on the defendant's showing that the
exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent to the police at the time they lost or
destroyed it, and that the police acted in bad faith. See, e.g., United States v. Jobson,
102 F.3d 214, 219 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no constitutional violation where police
failed to preserve a dispatch tape because there was no evidence that the dispatch
tape would contain exculpatory information).
269. As a precondition for recovery under section 1983, the plaintiff must have
suffered harm by conviction or punishment. See Williams v. Krystopa, No. Civ. A. 98-
CV-1119, 1998 WL 961375, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1998) (holding that despite the
egregious conduct of the prosecution and the police in suppressing a police report, the
Brady violation resulted in no due process deprivation because the defendant,
plaintiff in the section 1983 action, was acquitted at trial after spending 530 days in an
adult correctional facility between the time of arraignment and acquittal). Also,
plaintiff's conviction or sentence must have "been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal.., or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus...." Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). The police duty is to disclose evidence to the
prosecutor or the court, not to the defense. See Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 708 (4th
Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999) (finding police absolutely
immune from civil suit for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense).
270. See, e.g., Jean, 155 F.3d at 705 (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997))
(holding prosecutors absolutely immune from suit when performing functions that
require the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332,
336 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that a prosecutor cannot be held personally liable for
knowing suppression of exculpatory information); Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d
1550, 1552-53 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1975)) (finding
of absolute immunity for claim based on prosecutor's alleged solicitation of false
testimony).
271. See Jean, 155 F.3d at 708.
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failure to disclose evidence to the prosecutor violated clearly
established constitutional rights under Brady.' -
The recent case of Jean v. Collinsm illustrates the operation of
qualified immunity in this context. Lesly Jean was convicted of rape
and given two consecutive life sentences. He spent nine years in
prison before his conviction was reversed because of Brady
violations. 74 Following his release, Jean sued the police under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to reveal exculpatory evidence. A Fourth
Circuit panel ruled that the police have a direct duty under Brady to
disclose material exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor:
If the police allow the State's Attorney to produce evidence pointing
to guilt without ever informing him of other evidence in their
possession which contradicts this inference, state officers are
practicing deception not only on the State's Attorney but on the
court and the defendant .... -
On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit en banc conceded the existence of
this duty, 76 but, adopting a rigorous test for deciding whether the duty
to disclose was "clearly established" at the time the police failed to
disclose, held that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the test.-n On review,
the Supreme Court summarily vacated the Fourth Circuit's opinion,
remanding the case for reconsideration in light of an intervening case
that also upheld a claim of qualified immunity for law enforcement
officials.278
Both the Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court opinions in Jean show
an inclination to grant qualified immunity to police officers unless
fairly explicit authority establishes the unconstitutionality of their
272 See id.
273. 155 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 1998).
274. See Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82,83 (4th Cir. 1991).
275. Jean v. Collins, 107 F.3d 1111, 1119 (4th Cir. 1997) (Hamilton, J., concurring)
(quoting Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964)), vacated en banc, 155
F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).
276. See Jean, 155 F.3d at 710 & n.3.
277. Over a dissent by five judges, the Fourth Circuit held that, to determine
whether a right was clearly established at a particular time, a federal circuit court
need not look beyond decisions of the Supreme Court, the relevant circuit court, and
the highest court of the state in which the case arose. See id. at 709. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Murnaghan accused the Jean majority of moving "to a rule of actually
unqualified, though technically called qualified, immunity for police officers [by, inter
alia] a dramatic narrowing of that law which, for police officers, will be considered
well-settled at the critical time." Id. at 712-13.
278. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1695 (1999) (upholding Fourth Circuit
finding of qualified immunity of defendant state and federal law enforcement officials
against claim that their actions violated the Fourth Amendment for allowing media to
enter a home searched pursuant to a warrant, on ground that the right allegedly
violated was not "clearly established" at the time). The Court suggested that the
plaintiff needs to show either "cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the
time of the incident which clearly established the rule on which they seek to rely," or
"a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not
have believed that his actions were lawful." Id. at 1700.
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conduct. With regard to the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the prosecutor, however, the immunity defense is becoming obsolete.
Although some courts have upheld police immunity on the ground
that, at the relevant time, the duty to disclose was not "clearly
established,"27 9 a growing number of courts have recognized the
duty.280
Beyond the liability of individual officers, a police department's
failure to establish and enforce procedures governing the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence might subject the responsible city or county to
liability under section 1983.81 This theory was argued in Carter v.
Harrison,282 by a plaintiff who had spent 28 months in prison for a
murder he did not commit. Alleging police suppression of crucial
exculpatory statements by several witnesses, he sued the city under
section 1983, claiming injury from its policy or custom of failing to
train and supervise police to implement Brady.2 3 A federal district
court found sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to the
city's "grossly negligent" or "deliberately indifferent" failure.284 The
court rejected as inadequate written guidelines requiring detectives to
record all "relevant evidence:"
The recording of "all relevant evidence" does not accomplish the
goal of recording and preserving exculpatory evidence. A police
officer investigating a crime is likely to assume that relevant
279. See Jean, 155 F.3d at 708, 710 & n.3 (ruling that although reasonable police
officer in 1982 would not have known that failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to
prosecutor violated criminal defendant's Brady right, intervening court decisions
"now provide notice to police officers that they can be subject to monetary damages
under section 1983 for failure to disclose"). The Fourth Circuit's dictum in Jean was
qualified, but essentially preserved, in an unpublished disposition. See Walker v.
Sopher, Nos. 95-2248 & 96-1088, 1998 WL 682283, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998).
280. See Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1999); McMillian v. Johnson, 88
F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir.
1988); Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Krystopa,
No. Civ. A. 98-CV-1119, 1998 WL 961375, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1998); Hernandez-
Fontan v. City of Lancaster, No. Civ. A. 96-CV-5653, 1998 WL 474171 at *7 n.12
(E.D. Pa. July 31, 1998); Ahlers v. Schebil, 966 F. Supp. 518, 527 (E.D. Mich. 1997);
Carter v. Harrison, 612 F. Supp. 749,756 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
281. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978); see also
Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DePaul L.
Rev. 627, 651-67 (1999) (discussing municipal liability for failure to train employees to
avoid violating federal rights); Livingston, supra note 248, at 822 (1999) (discussing
use of consent decrees under Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (1994), which prohibits governmental authorities from
engaging in "a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers.., that
deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States").
282. 612 F. Supp. 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
283. See id. at 754.
284. Id. at 759; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (finding
municipal liability for failure to train or supervise requires proof of city's "deliberate
indifference" to the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into
contact).
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evidence includes only inculpatory information. -
By implication, municipalities risk liability if they fail expressly to
train police to record, preserve, and reveal exculpatory evidence.?
By adopting rules and standards stressing the prosecutor's
obligation to make the police aware of the need to collect and reveal
negative information, the ABA would reinforce the courts' growing
willingness to impose civil liability on police who suppress such
evidence. In the end, the prospect of such liability is likely to give
police the greatest incentive to overcome their reluctance to "help"
the accused.
4. Specific Categories of Potentially Exculpatory Evidence that
Prosecutors Should Routinely Seek from Police
In addition to elaborating the prosecutor's role as legal advisor to
the police, the proposed commentary to Standard 3-2.7 should stress
the importance of persuading the police to adopt reporting forms that
would call for specific categories of potentially exculpatory evidence.
On this point, both the English system, and recently adopted local
rules for the federal District Court for Massachusetts, suggest
directions for reform.
As described in Part II of this Article, the English use detailed
codes to describe the types of information that police must record,
retain and make available to prosecutors.3 These codes provide
checklists of potentially exculpatory evidence-such as notebook
entries, first descriptions by potential witnesses, information from
tapes or telephone records, defendant's explanation of an offense" -
which alert both the police and prosecutors to the possible existence
of specific materials that might be disclosable to the defense. In
contrast, American court rules and standards rarely specify categories
of exculpatory evidence that prosecutors must disclose and, therefore,
obtain from investigators. Instead, guidance takes the form of general
formulae, ranging from constitutionally mandated disclosure of
"favorable and material" evidence, to sub-constitutional standards
285. Carter, 612 F. Supp. at 756; see also Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 27-
28 (concluding from examination of police training materials, which commonly
instruct police to report "all relevant information," that "[bly implication ...
exculpatory evidence does not qualify").
286. Section 1983 claims against municipalities may also rest upon failure to train
prosecutors to disclose Brady material. See Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293,
300 (2d. Cir. 1992) (finding that complete failure by district attorney to train
prosecutors on compliance with Brady could constitute -deliberate indifference"
under section 1983). Walker had been convicted of murder and spent 19 years in
prison. The prosecutor failed to disclose, among other things, that a witness failed to
pick Walker out of a lineup, instead identifying another man, "apparently a police
officer," as the perpetrator. Id. at 295.
287. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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requiring disclosure of evidence that is "exculpatory," '289 or that "tends
to negate the guilt of the accused.""29  These formulae leave the
precise scope and timing of the disclosure duty unclear, particularly
with respect to evidence that does not directly exculpate the
defendant.29'
In response to uncertainty regarding the scope of required pretrial
disclosure by the prosecution, a court could supplement the general
standards defining what must be disclosed with rules describing
specific categories of exculpatory evidence. This approach is taken by
the innovative discovery rules recently adopted by the United States
District Court for Massachusetts. 2 2 Designed to "minimize the
possibility that the government will fail to meet its responsibilities
[and] to maximize consistency in the practices among prosecutors and
judicial officers, 293 these rules articulate the specific requirements of
Brady more comprehensively and in more detail than other rules or
standards. Because they itemize material that courts might require
prosecutors to disclose, they provide prosecutors with a framework
for deciding what potentially exculpatory information they should
seek from the police.294
289. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14; Mich. R. Crim. P. 6.201; Miss. Uniform Cir. &
County Ct. R. 9.04; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.23(1) (West 1998). Some state court
discovery rules limit the prosecutor's disclosure duty to "any material evidence
favorable" to the defendant. See N.M. R. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 5-501; Penn. R. Crim.
P. 305.
290. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
291. Disputes often occur over whether, and when, prosecutors must disclose
evidence that would impeach the credibility of prosecution witnesses or provide leads
to exculpatory evidence. The Supreme Court has interpreted Brady to allow no
distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. See United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154 (1972). Professional responsibility rules and standards are at least as broad.
However, none of these duties necessarily apply at the pretrial stage. See supra note
231 and accompanying text. Professional responsibility rules typically require
"timely" disclosure to the defense, reflecting Brady's ambiguity as to the precise
timing required. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d) (1999); Model
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(B) (1980); Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function Standard 3-3.11 (a) (3d ed.
1992). This ambiguity permits prosecutors to interpret pretrial disclosure rules as not
extending to impeachment evidence. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 221, at 568-69,
574-76 (discussing how some federal prosecutors in Northern California feel free to
refrain from requesting from investigators, or disclosing, impeachment material); cf
United States v. Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76, 85-86 (D. Mass. 1996) (construing First
Circuit cases to require disclosure "coincident with the scope of cross-examination to
be afforded in a criminal case").
For an overview of the many questions that have arisen in applying Brady, see
James Lappan, 79 Questions: The Catechism of Brady v. Maryland, 35 Crim. L. Bull.
277 (1999).
292. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
293. The new rules also aim "to implement the principle that different forms of
exculpatory information should ordinarily be disclosed at different times." Mass.
Rules Committee Report, supra note 207, at 5.
294. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.2(A).
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Subject to judicially-approved exceptions in the interest of justice,15
the Local Rules require automatic disclosure in felony cases of
specified categories of evidence, including both general' and
exculpatory297 evidence. The Rules expand and clarify the
prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in three ways.
First, the Rules expansively define the concept of "exculpatory"
information that must be disclosed.29 Second, they regulate the
295. See id. Rule 116.6. The Rules include procedures for resolving discovery
disputes before trial. See id. Rules 116.3, 117.1.
296. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.1(C). This category
includes, inter alia, all identification procedures. Thus, the government must disclose
"[a] written statement whether the defendant was a subject of an investigative
identification procedure... involving a line-up, show-up, photo spread or other
display of an image of the defendant." Id. Rule 116.1(C)(1)(f). The rule also requires
that "[i]f the defendant was a subject of such a procedure, a copy of any videotape,
photo spread, image or other tangible evidence reflecting, used in or memorializing
the identification procedure." 1d.; see also id. Rule 1162(B)(1)(f) (requiring a written
description of the failure of any percipient witness to make a positive identification of
defendant at identification procedure).
297. See id Rule 116.2.. The most recent edition of the ABA Standards for
Discovery offers a different version of this approach. It requires broad, automatic
disclosure of "all relevant information" held by the team of prosecution and
investigatory personnel, see Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by
Jury Standard 11-2.1(a) cmt. (3d ed. 1996), as well as specific items of relevant
information, such as the names and addresses of "all persons known to the
prosecution to have information concerning the offense charged, together with all
written statements," id. Standard 11-2.1(a)(ii), and all tangible items that pertain to
the case. See id. Standard 11-2.1(a)(v).
298. The Rule's drafters rejected as unsatisfactory the Supreme Court's limitation
of Brady to "material" evidence, defined retrospectively as existing "only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682 (1985). "Reasonable probability" was defined as "a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
Recognizing the need for a more useful test in the pretrial context, the Rules
Committee adopted a prospective test drawn from Kyles. Favorable evidence is
"material" for purposes of required disclosure:
if there is a reasonable probability that, if the evidence is disclosed to the
defendant, he could properly be acquitted because of the presence of a
reasonable doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does
not inculpate the defendant ....
Mass. Rules Committee Report, supra note 207, at V(A) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 433-35 (1995)). Expanding upon this definition, the Committee cited with
apparent approval the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of "materiality" as
used in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C), requiring pretrial production
by the government of documents "which are material to the preparation of the
defendants' defense." Materiality exists where there is:
some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would
enable the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor.
This materiality standard normally is not a heavy burden, rather, evidence is
material as long as there is a strong indication that it will play an important
role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation,
corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal.
Id. at V(A) (quoting United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993))
(citations, internal quotations, and ellipses omitted). The Committee Report,
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presumptive timing of disclosure of different categories of evidence.29
Third, and most significantly for our purposes, they require the
prosecutor automatically to disclose a number of specific categories of
information without regard to the prosecutor's judgment whether, in a
particular case, the information is "material" and "favorable to the
accused.''3° The Local Rules thus resemble the English model in two
respects: first, they "codify" particular categories of information
which are presumptively disclosable; and second, they specifically
require the prosecutor to obtain that information from the police. 0'
In addition to automatically disclosable general information, such as
identification procedures,3° the Rules require automatic pretrial
disclosure of three kinds of exculpatory information: (1)
"[i]nformation that would tend directly to negate the defendant's
acknowledges that "neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has addressed the
definition of materiality in this context, and this issue may have to be resolved in the
litigation of future cases in this District .... Id.
Inspired by this broadened standard of "materiality" the Rules define disclosable
exculpatory evidence as follows:
"Exculpatory information," which must be disclosed includes but is not
limited to "all information that is material and favorable to the accused"
because it tends to:
(1) Cast doubt on defendant's guilt as to any essential element in any count
in the indictment or information;
(2) Cast doubt on the admissibility of [certain] evidence that the government
anticipates offering in its case-in-chief, that might be subject to a motion to
suppress or exclude .... ;
(3) Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any evidence that the
government anticipates offering in its case-in-chief; or
(4) Diminish the degree of the defendant's culpability or... Offense Level
under [sentencing guidelines]."
D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.2(A).
299. Unlike the previous Rules, which required routine disclosure of exculpatory
evidence "as soon as counsels' trial engagements permit and in all events within
fourteen (14) days after arraignment," the 1998 Rules establish four different
presumptive times for the disclosure of different categories of evidence. See D. Mass
Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.2(B). Once triggered, the duty to disclose is
continuous. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.7. It is not clear when
the duty ends.
300. See infra notes 302-15 and accompanying text.
301. Local Rule 116.8 requires the prosecutor to inform "all ... law enforcement
agencies formally participating in the criminal investigation ... of the discovery
obligations set forth [in the Rules] and obtain any information subject to disclosure
from each such agency." D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.8. Both Rule
116.8 and Rule 116.9, requiring police to preserve relevant documents in their
possession, apply only to law enforcement agents whose agency at the time was
formally participating in a criminal investigation. See id. Rules 116.8, 116.9; see also
supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing disclosure responsibilities under the English system).
The scope of Rule 116.1(A)(1) is broader, subjecting to automatic discovery "all
discoverable material and information in the possession, custody, or control of the
government.., the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence
may become known, to the [prosecutor] .... " D. Mass. R. Concerning Crim. Cases
116.1(A)(1).302. See D. Mass. Local R. Concerning Crim. Cases 116.1(C)(1)(f).
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guilt" of the charged offenses;3 3 (2) "[i]nformation that would cast
doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the government anticipates
offering in its case-in-chief;"I and (3) "[a]ny information that tends
to cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy" of evidence and witnesses
that the government anticipates presenting in its case-in-chief. - s The
Rules go on to list specific items of exculpatory information regarding
the government's anticipated case-in-chief witnesses that must be
disclosed: information regarding promises, rewards or inducements,3
criminal records,3 7 pending criminal cases,0 the witness' failure to
make a positive identification of the defendant in an identification
procedure,3' any inconsistent statements made by the witness,310
statements made by any person that are inconsistent with any
statement made by the witness,3 information reflecting the witness'
bias or prejudice against the defendant,312 bad acts committed by the
witness,313 and information regarding any mental or physical
impairment that may cast doubt on the witness' ability to testify
accurately or truthfully.314 The Rules also require disclosure of a
"failure of any percipient witness... to make a positive identification
of a defendant" at an identification procedure.1 5
The Local Rules are significant not simply because they require
broad disclosure to the defense,316 but because they articulate the
specific requirements of Brady in such detail. They could, therefore,
guide prosecutors in deciding what potentially exculpatory
information they should seek from the police. For example, many of
the items required by the Local Rules are readily known to
303. Id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(a).
304. Id. Rule 116.2(B)(1)(b).
305. Id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(a).
306. See id Rule 116.2(B)(1)(c).
307. See id Rule 116.2(B)(1)(d).
308. See id Rule 116.2(B)(1)(e).
309. See iL Rule 116.2(B)(1)(f) (applying only to percipient witnesses -identified
by name").
310. "[O]r a description of such a statement, made orally or in writing... regarding
the alleged criminal conduct of the defendant." Id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(b).
311. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(c). Oral statements are included, and the witness'
statement must be about the alleged criminal conduct of the defendant. See id.
312. See id Rule 116.2(B)(2)(d).
313. See id. Rule 116.2(B)(2)(f). Specifically, such background includes any
prosecutable federal offense, or conduct that may be admissible under Federal Rule
of Evidence 608(b), known by the government to have been committed by the
witness. See id
314. See id Rule 116.2(B)(2)(g).
315. See id Rule 116.2(B)(1)(f) (emphasis added); supra note 302.
316. Judicial precedents support most if not all of the Rules' disclosure
requirements. The Supreme Court has held that the prosecutor's Brady duty extends
to evidence affecting witness credibility. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
674-78 (1985). Regarding specific types of impeachment evidence that must be
disclosed, see Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education, Federal Criminal
Practice § 7.51 (1997) (collecting cases).
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investigators, and could be reported in designated spaces on standard
and/or on supplementary forms for reporting criminal incidents and
arrests. For instance, report forms could call for "first descriptions" of
the perpetrator, an account of any identification procedure, and the
failure of any percipient witness to identify the suspect. Report forms
could also call for inconsistent statements made by inculpating
witnesses, as well as observed mental or physical impairments, such as
intoxication, that might cast doubt on their ability to report
accurately. Other categories of information, such as exculpatory
statements made by the suspect and others, could also be expressly
sought.
Other items required by the Rules-such as prior bad acts or
pending investigations or prosecutions against prospective
government witnesses-might not be suited for inclusion in standard
police reports, because they involve facts that would not normally be
known by the investigating officer. Prosecutors could seek this
information from the police by means of other, later-transmitted
forms. Precisely what information should be reported, at what level of
detail, in what kinds of cases, and at what stages of the proceedings,
are matters beyond the scope of this Article. Reasonable people
might disagree on the particulars of any proposal, but not, I think, on
the principle that prosecutors should endeavor to persuade police to
include exculpatory information on police reports. 3 7 The duty to
undertake that effort follows from the prosecutor's responsibility to
meet the challenge posed by Kyles.
CONCLUSION
In Kyles v. Whitley,318 the Supreme Court asserted that a prosecutor
has "the means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility,"
by establishing "procedures and regulations" to ensure a flow of all
317. One might object to inclusion of exculpatory evidence on police reports on the
ground that, in jurisdictions allowing defense discovery of such reports, the defense
might gain access to material that would not otherwise be disclosable, and exploit it in
damaging ways. See Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 56-58 (suggesting that the
solution of restricting defense access to, or use of, reported material, is preferable to
the current regime, which tolerates police suppression of relevant information from
the prosecutor). One could also consider the English procedure in which the police
use separate schedules to reveal sensitive material to the prosecutor and reveal
"super-sensitive" material to the prosecutor orally. See CPIA Code of Practice, supra
note 33, §§ 6.12-6.14. The English also permit the prosecution to apply ex parte for
judicial approval to withhold otherwise disclosable sensitive material from the
defense, under the doctrine of public interest immunity. See Leng & Taylor, supra
note 31, at 22, 47-48. By insisting that police do reveal even sensitive material to the
prosecutor, and requiring judicial approval of non-disclosure in special circumstances,
the English system has the advantage of making and preserving a record of relevant,
non-disclosed material for later review.
318. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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relevant information from the police to her office.-"' In reality, such
procedures are generally lacking. The English have legislated a
comprehensive regulatory framework for police record-keeping and
revelation of case information to the prosecutor. They have also
devoted significant resources to enforcing this regulation. The
English system contrasts starkly with our laissez-faire approach to
police record-keeping.
As reflected in the Supreme Court's treatment of the issue in Kyles,
we have consigned to prosecutors the duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence known to the police, without devoting particular attention or
resources to the issue of implementation. To be sure, as the English
experience illustrates, the cost-efficiency of a comprehensive and
ambitious effort to produce more "objective" records of investigation
is open to question. Nonetheless, the seriousness with which the
English have addressed the Kyles issue compares favorably to our
own posture of denial and neglect. Because neither legislatures nor
courts will likely redress this problem, prosecutors must take
responsibility for establishing the "procedures and regulations"
referred to in Kyles. The current professional responsibility rules and
standards do not adequately recognize and support that responsibility.
The amendments proposed here to the ABA Model Rules and
Standards represent a modest step toward breathing life into a
process, described in Kyles, which should but does not yet exist.




ORGANIZATION OF CRIMINAL COURTS, PROSECUTION AND POLICE,
AND POLICE RECORD-KEEPING, IN ENGLAND
Jurisdiction of Courts
Criminal offences in England fall into one of three jurisdictional
categories: "summary," "indictable only," and "either-way."
"Summary offences," which comprise the vast majority of all criminal
offenses, 320 are tried without a jury in the magistrates' court.321 The
most serious crimes are prosecuted by indictment in the Crown Court,
before a jury. "Either-way" offenses are tried either in magistrates'
court or in Crown Court, at the defendant's optionA.1 First
appearances and other preliminary proceedings for all criminal
defendants occur in the magistrates' court; in appropriate cases,
magistrates hold "committal proceedings" to decide whether sufficient
evidence exists to commit a defendant for trial in the Crown Court.3
Prosecution
Until 1985, England employed a system of private prosecution
under which the police themselves prosecuted minor crimes, and
retained lawyers to prosecute more serious crimes. In 1879, the post
of Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP") was created in the
Attorney-General's office.32 4 The DPP was given power to control
prosecutions for the most serious crimes.3' In 1986, with the creation
of the Crown Prosecution Service ("CPS"), the system of centrally
controlled public prosecution was extended to all criminal offenses. 326
Crown Prosecutors have no power to direct police investigations or
control the initial charging decision, 327 but the CPS has power to
320. Over 90% of criminal cases are heard at the magistrates' courts. See Niblett,
supra note 31, at 35.
321. In a summary trial a panel of three lay magistrates usually decides the case.
See Hatchard, supra note 31, at 181.
322. See id.
323. As a result of 1998 legislation, a new system is being introduced by which cases
triable on indictment only will go immediately to Crown Court without any committal
hearings. See Blackstone's Criminal Practice, supra note 31, § D7.1.
324. See Andrew Sidman, Note, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25
Am. U. L. Rev. 754, 760 (1976).
325. See id. at 760-61.
326. See Francis Bennion, The New Prosecution Arrangements: The Crown
Prosecution Service, 1986 Crim. L. Rev. 3, 9-14. The Service was created by the
Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, which became fully operational in 1986.
327. See Ashworth, supra note 31, at 178. Crown Prosecutors are available to
consult with police before charges are brought. See Hatchard, supra note 31, at 198-
99.
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continue, modify or stop all criminal proceedings in their preliminary
stages.32s  CPS lawyers (solicitors) prosecute offenses in the
magistrates' court, and normally retain barristers to conduct
proceedings in Crown Court.329  The latter are independent
practitioners who might appear in some cases for the prosecution and
in others for the defense. Barristers are therefore considered more
objective and less identified with the parties than solicitors, who are
directly employed by their clients. This is especially true of a
prosecuting barrister: the Bar's Code of Conduct states that he
"should not regard himself as appearing for a party. He should lay
before the Court fairly and impartially the whole of the facts which
comprise the case for the prosecution and should assist the Court on
all matters of law applicable to the case."33"
The Police; Records of Police Investigation
Although England has no national police force, since 1918 the
central government has had oversight of the local police forces."3
English police are organized into forty-three police forces, each
headed by a Chief Constable, except the two London forces, which
are headed by a Commissioner? 2 Each force is answerable to a local,
elected Police Authority, which pays forty-nine percent of the police
budget; the remaining fifty-one percent is paid by the central
government.333 In matters not controlled by national legislation, local
police forces are free to adopt their own policies. However, the
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), consisting of all forty-
three force chiefs, plays an important role in promoting discussion and
328. See Blackstone's Criminal Practice, supra note 31, §§ D2.33, 2.38.
329. In English nomenclature, "lawyer" generally refers to a solicitor, and
"counsel" to a barrister. Solicitors and barristers receive different training, and are
bound by separate codes of professional conduct. Solicitors are represented by the
Law Society; barristers, but not solicitors, belong to the Bar. Traditionally, only
barristers have a "right of audience" in Crown Courts, but this is changing in the
direction of allowing solicitors to try cases in Crown Court and to appear in higher
courts. See Hatchard, supra note 31, at 207-08; Harry Cohen, From the British
Newspapers and Legal Magazines-Changes in the British Legal Profession?, 23 J.
Legal Prof. 3, 9 (1999); Michael Zander, Private Lawyers in Contemporary Society:
United Kingdom, 25 Case W. Res. J. Int'l. L. 207, 207-14 (1993); Francis Gibb, Lord
Chancellor Eyes Bar's Last Preserve, Times (London), Dec. 12, 1997, at 6, available in
1997 WL 9249120; Julia Hartley-Brewer, Call for End to Barristers' Higher Courts
Monopoly, Evening Standard (London), June 25, 1998, at 18, available in 1998 WL
13923293.
330. See Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, Standard 11.1.
Standard 11.2 imposes on prosecuting counsel a duty "to ensure that all relevant
evidence is either presented by the prosecution or made available to the defence." Id.
Standard 11.2.
331. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs has overall responsibility for the
police. See Hatchard, supra note 31, at 205-06.
332- See interviews with several staff at West Mercia Constabulary Headquarters,
Training and Development, in Hindlip, Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 15, 1999).
333. See id.
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adoption of uniform procedures among the different forces. For
example, in cooperation with the Crown Prosecution Service, ACPO
has promulgated national guidelines for the preparation and
submission of police files.334  Also, an independent national body
exists to investigate complaints of police abuses.
Records of police investigation vary according to the particular
investigative procedure employed, the nature and seriousness of the
crime,3 6 and the location of the particular police force.37  Despite
such variations, as the result of legislation, police practice codes, and
custom, certain types of records are commonly kept. These include
police notebooks, crime reports, custody records, statements of
suspects and witnesses, records of identification procedures, computer
investigation data (HOLMES) and policy books.
Police Notebooks
Uniformed police constables in England carry pocket notebooks in
which they normally338 must record their daily activities, including
investigations of criminal activity and witness statements.3 39 In order
to deter after the fact editing or "loss" of exculpatory information, the
books are numbered and bound, and have numbered pages.340 A
334. See Roger Ede & Eric Shepherd, Active Defence: A Lawyer's Guide to
Police and Defence Investigation and Prosecution and Defence Disclosure in
Criminal Cases 145 (1998) (citing Manual of Guidance for the Preparation, Processing
and Submission of Files (1st ed. 1992)).
335. This body, the Police Complaints Authority, was established by PACE. See
Belloni & Hodgson, supra note 31, at 75-81.
336. See generally Maguire & Norris, supra note 108 (presenting models and
methods of management for investigation of serious crimes).
337. Different police forces may use different forms to serve a particular function.
For example, some police forces require officers to fill out printed crime report forms,
while other forces rely on computer word processing to create equivalent reports. See
interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester,
U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
338. In some cases they might instead use incident record books, see Ede &
Shepherd, supra note 334, at 35, or special offense books containing forms for traffic
offenses, for example. Special numbered logs, with numbered pages, are also used in
police surveillance work. See Rob R. Jerrard, The Police Officer's Notebook, 157 Just.
of the Peace 8 (1993); Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 80-83.
339. See Jerrard, supra note 338, at 6; see also Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at
36-37 (regular checks of police notebook used as supervisory tool). PACE Code of
Practice C, paragraph 11.5(b), requires the record of any interview with suspects to be
written in the officer's notebook or on forms provided for that purpose. See Codes of
Practice Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C, § 11.5(b) (1999),
reprinted in Blackstone's Criminal Practice, app. 2 (Peter Murphy et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter PACE Codes of Practice]. In practice, if the interviews are not tape
recorded, they are written on forms.
340. In 1993 the Runciman Commission recommended that all forces should adopt
this practice. See Runciman Comm'n Report, supra note 47, at 22. I do not know
whether any American police force employs this safeguard. In some, note taking is
apparently very informal. See, e.g., William B. Sanders, Detective Work 42 (1977)
(reporting criticism of one police force in which "each detective took his own notes on
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record is kept of each book's number and the date it is issued to a
particular officer?41
Crime Report Forms
As in the United States, English police are commonly required to
file police reports, reciting essential data regarding each criminal
incident resulting in arrest and/or prosecution. 2
Custody Records
As a means of avoiding abuses in police detention and questioning
of suspects, PACE introduced strict record-keeping requirements, to
be administered by a specially-designated "custody officer." - 3  The
custody officer must be someone of supervisory rank who is not
involved in the investigation. 4 This officer's duties include, inter alia,
keeping a detailed, contemporaneously written record of the suspect's
detention,3 5 including the grounds therefor, and all relevant events
during detention, such as the time and place of all questioning, advice
of rights, and the presence of or contacts with a lawyer:' The custody
record must also include a list of the suspect's possessions when taken
into custody. 7  A copy of the custody record is available to the
suspect upon his release from custody.?
scraps of paper"); Fisher, Just the Facts, supra note 17, at 30 (describing how, in the
Atlanta Police Department, officers are taught the strategic advantages and
disadvantages of bound versus loose-leaf notebooks).
341. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in
Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
342. The crime report contains, inter alia, details of the complaint, the complainant,
the offense, description of the suspect, and investigation conducted at the scene. See
Ede & Shepherd, supra note 334, at 23-25, 39-40. In some forces instead of
completing a crime report form the officer will directly enter the pertinent data on a
portable computer data terminal, or call in the information to the station, where it will
be transcribed. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police
H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
343. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 78, §§ 36-39 (Eng.); PACE
Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code C § 2.3. For general discussion of the role of
the custody officer, see Zander, supra note 31, at 74-80, 92-96,156-62.
344. See PACE, supra note 114, § 36(3), (5). For criticism of the custody officer's
purported "independence," see McConville et al., supra note 31, at 118-22. Cf Brown,
PACE Ten Years On, supra note 31, at 2 ("Custody officers show considerable
independence in the way they carry out their job although practical constraints limit
their examination of the evidence against the suspect when considering whether to
authorise detention."); see also Coleman et al., supra note 31, at 24, 30-31
(questioning the role and activities of custody officers); Maguire & Norris, supra note
108, at 27 (noting that disagreement exists over whether intended effects of Act have
been achieved).
345. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 78, § 37(4) (Eng.).
346. See Zander, supra note 31, at 156-57.
347. See PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code C § 4.4
348. See Zander, supra note 31, at 157; PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339,
Code C § 2.4.
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Statements of Suspects
Subject to certain exceptions, police interviews with suspects and
suspects' statements, must be tape recorded.349 If tape recording is not
feasible, a contemporaneous written record should be made."
Transcripts or summaries are made of taped interviews.35 1
Witness Statements
Statements of witnesses, including police officers, are commonly
reduced to writing and signed."
Identification Procedures
PACE provides that identification procedures must be supervised
by an "Identification Officer," who is a uniformed officer not lower
than the rank of inspector, who must not be involved in the
investigation.3  The Identification Officer's duties include
administering lineups and other identification procedures, and making
a record of the same on forms provided."5 Prior to the conduct of
identification procedures, the witness' first description of the
perpetrator must be recorded, and a copy given to the suspect or his
349. PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code E § 3.
350. PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code E § 3.4. For skeptical
comments on the ability of police to take accurate contemporaneous notes, see Ede &
Shepherd, supra note 334, at 229-30.
351. In light of interest in the United States in reforms requiring taping of police
interrogation of suspects, see Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: Videotaping the Police,
17 Crim. Just. Ethics, Winter/Spring 1998, at 42 (symposium), Americans will be
interested in developments in England. Studies report both evasion of the
requirements by unrecorded "scenic route" interviews before arrival at the police
station, and that "the vast majority of tapes are never heard by anyone, as defences
[sic] request them in very few cases." Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 116. On
the impact of PACE provisions requiring taping of police questioning, see Tom Bucke
& David Brown, In Police Custody: Police Powers and Suspects' Rights Under the
Revised PACE Codes of Practice 31-39 (Home Office Research Study No. 174, 1997);
Mike McConville, Videotaping Interrogations: Police Behaviour On and Off Camera,
1992 Crim. L. Rev. 532, 536, 540-42; Moston & Stephenson, supra note 31, at 41-47;
David Wolchover & Anthony Heaton-Armstrong, Questioning and Identification:
Changes under P.A.C.E. '95, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 356, 359. Regarding the time-
consuming task of transcribing and summarizing taped suspect interviews, see
Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 32-33 & n.4.
352 See Ede & Shepherd, supra note 334, at 48-49; Alan Mackie et al., Preparing
the Prosecution Case, 1999 Crim. L. Rev. 460,462.
353. See PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code D § 2.2. See generally
Zander, supra note 31, at 172-75. The rule prohibiting an officer who is involved in
the investigation from taking part in any identification procedure predates PACE by
many years. See Home Office Circular No. 9/1969, Identification Parades, para. 3,
reprinted in Lord Devlin, Report on the Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases,
app. A, at 159 (London: HMSO, 1976).
354. See PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code D §§ 2.2-2.4, 2.19-2.21.
Lineups are called "identification parades" in England. See id. Code D § 2.1-2.6.
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lawyer before further identification procedures take place. 55
Computer-Assisted Investigation: HOLMES
On occasion, the police investigate serious offenses such as murder,
rape and major robberies by setting up an "incident room," staffed by
detectives and uniformed officers brought together from different
police divisions.356 This is done when no obvious suspect or strong
leads exists; police therefore require extra investigative resources.
Such major inquiries are often conducted with the aid of the
computer-based Home Office (Large) Major Enquiry System
(HOLMES), a "computerized information storage and retrieval
system which allows for all information emanating from the inquiry to
be stored, indexed, cross referenced and interrogated for investigative
significance."'31 Data is entered, processed and accessed according to
standard procedures, and only by specially trained personnel who
operate independently from senior officers managing the
investigation? 58 Comprehensive records are kept of all information
received in the investigation, actions taken and their results. "Every
item relevant to the inquiry will either be logged in the system, as in
the case of exhibits, or actually contained within the system, as in the
case of statements or transcripts of interviews. -3 59
Investigations in which the police use HOLMES typically involve
intense publicity and corresponding pressure on the police to find the
criminal. Such investigations are therefore particularly prone to result
in suppression and fabrication of evidence. However, compared to
other investigative records, data gathered using HOLMES is
especially reliable. "[T]here is little incentive for junior officers to
manipulate witnesses or to fabricate evidence and, even if they did so,
355. PACE Codes of Practice, supra note 339, Code D § 2.0. This requirement
follows recommendations of the Runciman Commission, see Runciman Comm'n
Report, supra note 47, at 11, but was not adopted into law until 1995. See Wolchover
& Heaton-Armstrong, supra note 351, at 367. Code D also requires "the police to
disclose to the defense any media material relating to the appearance of a suspect
before any identification procedure is undertaken." Id. at 368 (citing provisions). For
background information on identification safeguards in English law, see generally
Anthony Heaton-Armstrong & David Wolchover, Exorcising Dougherty's Ghost, 141
New LJ. 137 (1991), and Glanville Williams, Evidence of Identification: The Devlin
Report, 1976 Crim. L. Rev. 407. PACE identification procedures provide an
interesting comparison to those followed in Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1991),
discussed supra at notes 273-277 and accompanying text.
356. Incident rooms are established in cases that require extra investigative
resources because no obvious suspect or strong leads exists. See interview with Head
of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999).
HOLMES investigations reportedly number fewer than one in a thousand cases. See
Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 55.
357. Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 57.
358. Maguire and Norris describe the HOLMES system in detail. See id. at 55-69;
see also Ede & Shepherd, supra note 334, at 53-56 (detailing the HOLMES system).
359. Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 68.
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there would be a high chance of it being discovered."360 For instance,
"if one witness claimed that a suspect had been present at the scene, a
[computer operation] would immediately indicate who else was
present, and checks could be made to see whether this information
could be corroborated. 3 61  Although senior investigating officers,
facing intense pressures to produce a "result," might be motivated to
conceal "inconvenient" evidence or fabricate "helpful" evidence, they
do not normally have direct access to the computer system.3 62 Also,
senior officers are sometimes subject to other, independent
monitoring of the investigation.3 63 Finally, "as all documentation is
held on a database, it would be difficult technically to tamper with the
system to delete statements, or even parts of statements, and leave no
trace. '' 364  In sum, therefore, HOLMES generates "[c]lear and
comprehensive documentation of the investigation. 365
A complete copy of HOLMES data is available to prosecutors,
and-subject to court-approved exceptions in particular cases-might
be disclosed to the defense. 66
Policy Books
In HOLMES major inquiries, a "policy book" is kept by a
designated administrator who reports to the Senior Investigating
Officer in charge of the inquiry.367 This document, which is logged as
a computer file, contains records "of all the major decisions taken in
an inquiry: for instance, the parameters of house to house inquiries,
which lines of investigation should be pursued and why, and the
decision to arrest and question a suspect. The Policy Book, therefore,
becomes a chronological record of the progress of the investigation
which is open to scrutiny ....
360. Id. at 64.
361. Id. at 68.
362. See id. at 64-65, 67-68.
363. See id. at 65, 68.
364. Id. at 68.
365. Id. at 61.
366. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text. Disclosure can conveniently
take the form of downloading the HOLMES files on to a floppy disk. See Ede &
Shepherd, supra note 334, at 301. A defense lawyer told me that, in a recent murder
case, the prosecutor had permitted him to go to the police station and look through
the entire computerized file of unused material. The solicitor spent a week reading
every "action log" entry. In some cases, he stated, such items have led to
exonerations. See interview with defense solicitor in Birmingham, U.K. (Apr. 13,
1999).
367. See interview with Head of Major Crimes Unit, West Mercia Police H.Q., in
Worcester, U.K. (Apr. 26, 1999); Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 58. The
Runciman Commission recommended that policy books (also called "policy files") be
kept in all major inquiries. See Runciman Comm'n Report, supra note 47, at 19.
368. See Maguire & Norris, supra note 108, at 66. I do not know whether
American police employ any analog to the English "Policy Book."
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APPENDIX B
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is
not supported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been
advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and
has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of
important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
[Proposed] (c-I) make reasonable efforts to ensure that investigators,
law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case reveal to the
prosecutor's office all material and information that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense or sentence.
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective
order of the tribunal;
(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law
enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an
extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from
making under Rule 3.6;
(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal
proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless
the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by
any applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion
of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the
information.
(g) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of
the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a
legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of
heightening public condemnation of the accused.
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3D ED. 1993)
STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION
STANDARD 3-2.7 RELATIONS WITH POLICE
(a) The prosecutor should provide legal advice to the police
concerning police functions and duties in criminal matters.
(b) The prosecutor should cooperate with police in providing the
services of the prosecutor's staff to aid in training police in the
performance of their function in accordance with law.
[Proposed] (c) A prosecutor should become familiar with existing law
enforcement record-keeping practices in the prosecutor's jurisdiction.
[Proposed] (d) The prosecutor should encourage and assist law
enforcement agencies to adopt a uniform police report that will
contain all information necessary for a successful prosecution and for
compliance with the prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable
information to the defense.
STANDARD 3-3.11 DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY THE
PROSECUTOR
[Proposed] (a-i) A prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to
ensure that all material and information which tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the accused is provided by
investigative personnel to the prosecutor's office.
(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely
disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the
existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the
guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.
(b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a reasonably diligent effort
to comply with a legally proper discovery request.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or
aid the accused.
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